


JPRS-UMA-94-020  
25 May 1994



**FOREIGN  
BROADCAST  
INFORMATION  
SERVICE**

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# ***JPRS Report***

## **Central Eurasia**

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***Military Affairs***

# Central Eurasia

## Military Affairs

JPRS-UMA-94-020

### CONTENTS

25 May 1994

#### CIS/RUSSIAN MILITARY ISSUES

##### POLICY

Presidential Edict on Spring 1994 Draft	[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 19 Apr]	1
Grachev Order on Spring Draft	[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 19 Apr]	1
Kokoshin Speaks to Military Finance Officers	[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 30 Apr]	1
CIS Agreement on Veterans Benefits	[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 4 May]	2
Withdrawal From Latvia Set for 31 August	[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 4 May]	4
Security Council Secretary Lobov Profiled	[ISVESTIYA 13 May]	4
Review of Military Reform	[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 6 May]	7
Army Reform Seen Beyond Political Control	[ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA 17 May]	9

##### AIR, AIR DEFENSE FORCES

Journalist Visit to PVO Command Center	[ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI No 65, 12 Apr]	11
New Airborne Training Center in Saratov Oblast	[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 29 Apr]	12

##### NAVAL FORCES

Submarine Fleet Said Not To Be Combat Ready	[MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLET 26 Mar]	13
Chernavin Accused on Lack of Readiness of Submarine Fleet	[STOLITSA No 12 (174), 1994]	14

##### REAR SERVICES, SUPPORT ISSUES

Col-Gen Churanov Discusses Problems of Rear Services	[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 13 Apr]	16
Balancing Defense, Transport Requirements Under New Doctrine	[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 15 Apr]	18
Activities of Fund for Social Protection of Servicemen	[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 29 Apr]	20
Supplying Troops From Military Farms	[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 4 May]	21

#### STATE AND LOCAL MILITARY FORCES

##### INTERREGIONAL MILITARY ISSUES

Conflict Over Black Sea Fleet Said to Be 'Unavoidable'	[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 13 Apr]	23
Description of Tension Surrounding Black Sea Fleet	[SEGODNYA 21 Apr]	23
Garrison Life at Skrunda Radar Facility	[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 6 May]	24

##### UKRAINE

Lopata, Directorate Heads Discuss Support Problems	[NARODNA ARMIYA 19 Apr]	25
Bizhan on Outcome of Black Sea Fleet Talks	[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 29 Apr]	28
Morozov Performance as Defense Minister Assailed	[ROSSIYA No 17, 4-10 May]	29

##### BELARUS

Concern over Large Number of Spring 1994 Discharges	[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 8 Apr]	30
---	-------------------------	----

##### BALTIC STATES

New Border Guards Commander Appointed	[LABRIT 16 Apr]	31
---------------------------------------	-----------------	----

## CAUCASIAN STATES

Talks in Bishkek, Karabakh Fighting Continues [KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 5 May] .....	31
Government Session Reviews Spring Call Up [RESPUBLIKA ARMENIYA 17 May] .....	32
Stricter Measures Against Draft Dodgers [RESPUBLIKA ARMENIYA 17 May] .....	32
Refugee Situation in Azerbaijan [KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 4 May] .....	32
Conscription Difficulties in Ganje [MOLODEZH AZERBAYDZHANA No 8, 19-26 May] .....	33

## GENERAL ISSUES

### ARMS TRADE

Summary of Results of FIDAE-94 Show [KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 30 Apr] .....	35
--	----

### DEFENSE INDUSTRY

Maley: Future Role of Defense Industry in Economy [DELOVOY MIR 11-17 Apr] .....	37
Shulunov: 'New Approaches to Conversion' [EKONOMIKA I ZHIZN No 15, Apr 1994] .....	40

### FOREIGN MILITARY AFFAIRS

Grachev Discusses Asian Security With Korean Defense Minister [KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 30 Apr] .....	41
---	----

### SECURITY SERVICES

Conscripts for Cossack Border Units Called Up [SEGODNYA No 74, 21 Apr] .....	41
Alpha Antiterrorist Unit Reviewed [KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 23 Apr] .....	42

## POLICY

### Presidential Edict on Spring 1994 Draft

944D0016A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
19 Apr 94 p 1

[Order No. 784 issued by the President of the Russian Federation on 15 April 1994 "On the Induction of Citizens of the Russian Federation Into the Military Service During the Period April-June 1994 and the Release from the Military Service of Soldiers, Seamen, NCOs, Senior Sergeants and Military Construction Workers Who Have Served Out the Established Term of Military Service"]

[Text] In accordance with the laws of the Russian Federation "On Defense" and "On Military Duty and Military Service," I hereby decree the following:

1. The induction in April-June 1994 into military service in the armed forces of the Russian Federation, other forces and military formations of the Russian Federation of 216,000 citizens of the Russian Federation born between the years 1967 and 1976, including those studying full-time at institutions of basic or secondary professional education who do not have deferments.
2. The discharge from the military service in April-June 1994 of soldiers, seamen, NCOs, senior sergeants and military construction workers who have served out their established terms of military service.
3. That the Government of the Russian Federation, executive agencies of the republics, krais, oblasts, the cities of Moscow and St. Petersburg, the autonomous oblast and autonomous okrugs are to implement measures pertaining to the draft of citizens into the military service.
4. The Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, jointly with other ministries and departments in which military service is specified, to present for approval a proposal on the distribution of citizens drafted into the military service in April-June 1994.
5. That individuals drafted into the military service be transported mostly in groups in specially scheduled passenger cars of trains or aircraft (naval vessels).

The Ministry of Railways of the Russian Federation and the Ministry of Transport of the Russian Federation are to allocate the necessary quantity of rolling stock, aircraft (naval vessels) or seats in passenger cars based on requisitions from the corresponding command element and to transport these individuals according to a schedule, implementing security measures, and to charge for these hauls at existing, mutually coordinated rates.

6. This Edict takes effect the moment it is signed.

B. Yeltsin,  
President of the Russian Federation  
Moscow, the Kremlin

### Grachev Order on Spring Draft

944D0016B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
19 Apr 94 p 1

[Order No. 116 issued by the Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation on 15 April 1994 "On the Induction of Citizens of the Russian Federation Into the Military Service in April-June 1994 and the Discharge Into the Reserve of Soldiers, Seamen, NCOs, Senior Sergeants and Military Construction Workers Who Have Served Out Their Established Term of Military Service"]

[Text] By way of implementing Edict No. 784 issued by the President of the Russian Federation on 15 April 1994,

#### I hereby order:

1. The release into the reserve from the ranks of the armed forces of the Russian Federation during the period April-June 1994 of soldiers, seamen, NCOs, senior sergeants and military construction workers who have served out the established term of military service.
2. The commanders of military districts and military commissariats, jointly with local administrative heads, to organize and conduct the draft into the military service in the armed forces of the Russian Federation, other forces and military formations during the period April-June 1994 of citizens of the Russian Federation born between 1967 and 1976 who do not have deferment or exemption from the military draft.
3. The order is to be announced in all companies, batteries and squadrons and on all ships.

Army General P. Grachev,  
Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation

### Kokoshin Speaks to Military Finance Officers

944D0028B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
30 Apr 94 p 2

[Article: "Financial Problems in the Spotlight"]

[Text] On 28 April Russian Federation First Deputy Minister of Defense Andrey Kokoshin spoke at a training conference of executive of the financial and economic services of the RF Armed Forces.

Elaborating on the positions stated by General of the Army Pavel Grachev, the defense minister, in a speech the day before, Andrey Kokoshin noted that today the role of budget and financing organizations and of economic services of the armed forces has risen noticeably.

A maximally careful attitude toward every ruble provided by the state at the expense of the Russian taxpayer is important as never before. Vigorous activity by specialists on financial and economic problems in regard to setting the prices of products and services used by the armed forces has enormous significance today. A constant effort is required to optimize the structure of expenditures on maintaining the armed forces, on purchases of military equipment, and on scientific research and experimental



design work. There are many examples here of such successful work, as was discussed during the conference, Andrey Kokoshin said.

In the opinion of the first deputy defense minister, far from everything possible has been done so far in the armed forces and in the Ministry of Defense. The latest information processing equipment and methods are being introduced too slowly. The forces of inertia still prevail in decisions of commanders of all ranks and executives of financial bodies of the Ministry of Defense, and many are slow in adapting to the new conditions.

A commission to effectively develop proposals for determining the priority directions of financial support to the vital activities of the armed forces, created by an order of the Ministry of Defense, is operating in the Ministry of Defense under the chairmanship of Andrey Kokoshin. The membership of this commission includes the chief of General Staff, deputy defense ministers, and the chiefs of a number of main directorates, including Colonel-General Vasily Vorobyev, chief of the Main Directorate of Military Budget and Financing.

Andrey Kokoshin illuminated the general status of the Russian economy. In his speech he noted the keen interest the army has in stabilization of the country's economy and its sociopolitical situation. Successful progress in military reform is, in the words of the first deputy minister, problematic in the absence of a stable economy, and of adequate solutions to the problems of financing the armed forces and enterprises filling defense orders. A very complex situation is developing here today, carrying the danger of a social explosion in a number of cases.

Andrey Kokoshin singled out the nonpayment problem as one of the most acute and immediate of the Russian economy. Unless it is solved, the objective of halting the decline in industry and the decrease in the income side of the federal budget, in which the armed forces are keenly interested, cannot be reached. The problem of nonpayment cannot be solved by a single thrust: Planned, purposeful work is required. At the same time measures of an emergency nature are also needed. One of them, upon which the first deputy defense minister insists, is immediate repayment of the state's debts pertaining to military and civilian products manufactured on the basis of state orders, and to services based on state orders. Kokoshin estimates the amount of such a one-time injection through state clients at 5-6 trillion rubles.

Tight control over passage of budget resources along the entire chain is also necessary today; financial bodies of the Ministry of Defense have an important role to play in this control.

### CIS Agreement on Veterans Benefits

944D0026A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
4 May 94 p 1

[Article: "They Served the Unified Fatherland: Showing Concern for Them Today is the Duty of All of Us"]

[Text] Agreement on Mutual Recognition of Benefits and Guarantees to Participants and Disabled Veterans of the Great Patriotic War, Participants of Combat Activities on the Territory of Other States, and Families of Servicemen Killed in Action

The governments of the states participating in this Agreement, referred to henceforth as the Parties:

- recognizing the special importance of social protection of disabled veterans and participants of the Civil and the Great Patriotic wars, participants of combat activities on the territory of other states, and families of servicemen killed in action,

- and basing themselves on the need for mutual recognition of benefits and guarantees to the above-indicated categories of persons on the territory of their states,

have agreed to the following:

#### Article 1

This Agreement shall extend to disabled veterans and participants of the Civil and Great Patriotic Wars, participants of combat activities on the territory of other states, families of servicemen killed in action, and to other categories of persons granted benefits by legislation of the former USSR in accordance with Attachment 1 to this Agreement.

#### Article 2

The categories of persons indicated in Article 1 of this Agreement shall enjoy benefits and guarantees foreseen by national legislation of the Parties and by this Agreement regardless of the Party to which the territory on which they reside belongs.

On the territory of their states the Parties shall not establish a volume of benefits and guarantees lower than what is foreseen by Attachment 2 to this agreement.

#### Article 3

The categories of persons indicated in Article 1 of this Agreement visiting the territory of the Parties temporarily shall enjoy the following benefits and guarantees:

1. Free first aid and emergency medical care until complete recovery, or as a minimum until such time that the patient's transportation to his place of resident does not endanger his health and life, without mutual compensation of expenditures by the Parties.

2. Acquisition, free or at a 50 percent discount, of drugs by prescriptions written by physicians at polyclinics in the host state in the case of outpatient (polyclinic) treatment, if the indicated categories of persons enjoy pharmaceutical support benefits established by Attachment 2 to this Agreement, without mutual compensation of expenditures of the Parties and on the basis of mutual agreement between them.
3. Preferential treatment by personal service, trade, public food service, housing and municipal management, and transportation enterprises and organizations, and reduced admissions to cultural and educational institutions in accordance with procedure determined by the host Party, if the indicated categories of persons enjoy these benefits in accordance with Attachment 2 to this Agreement.

#### Article 4

The rights of disabled veterans and participants of the Great Patriotic War to preferential travel on the corresponding forms of transportation shall be determined by the Agreement on Mutual Recognition of the Rights to Preferential Travel for Disabled Veterans and Participants of the Great Patriotic War, and Persons Equal to Them, signed by the heads of governments of the Commonwealth of Independent States on 12 March 1993.

#### Article 5

Expenditures associated with granting benefits and guarantees to categories of persons indicated in Article 1 of this Agreement shall be financed by the Parties in accordance with their national legislation.

#### Article 6

The Parties shall implement measures to ensure protection of the graves of and monuments to disabled veterans and participants of the Great Patriotic War, participants of combat activities on the territory of other states, and other categories of persons indicated in Article 1 of this Agreement.

#### Article 7

The Parties shall notify one another regarding changes in the legislation effective in their states in the area of social protection of the categories of persons indicated in Article 1 of this Agreement, by way of the Consultative Council for Labor, Migration and Social Protection of the Population of Member States of the Commonwealth of Independent States.

#### Article 8

Documents issued by the appropriate bodies of the former USSR or the Parties, in the formats effective as of 1 January 1992 and at the place of permanent residence of the person having the right to benefits, shall be the grounds for providing benefits.

If the indicated documents are issued in accordance with national legislation of the Parties to persons not indicated

in Attachment 1 to this Agreement, authorized bodies of the Parties shall mark them to indicate that these documents are valid only on the territory of the given Party.

#### Article 9

By mutual agreement the Parties may introduce the necessary changes into this Agreement in the form of supplementary protocols to the Agreement.

#### Article 10

Control over compliance with this Agreement shall be by authorized bodies of the Parties in accordance with their national legislation. Disputes shall be resolved by the Parties through mutual consultations.

#### Article 11

This Agreement shall take effect from the day certificates from three Parties confirming fulfillment of internal state procedures by the participating states necessary for its enactment are surrendered to a depositary.

#### Article 12

This Agreement shall remain open to other states sharing its goals and principles, which may join it by transferring annexation documents to the depositary.

#### Article 13

This Agreement shall be concluded for a term of 5 years, and each time it shall be extended automatically for 5 years. Any of the Parties may declare their intention to leave this Agreement by written notification of the depositary regarding this, not less than 6 months prior to expiration of the corresponding period.

Executed in the city of Moscow on 15 April 1994 in one authentic copy in Russian. The authentic copy shall be stored in the Archives of the Government of the Belarusian Republic, which shall send a notarized copy of it to states signing this Agreement.

The Agreement was signed by: The Republic of Azerbaijan, the Republic of Armenia, the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Georgia, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, the Republic of Moldova, the Russian Federation, the Republic of Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, the Republic of Uzbekistan and Ukraine.

FROM THE EDITOR: A protocol decision signed by Chairman of the Council of the Heads of Governments of the CIS and Chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation Viktor Chernomyrdin discusses the need "for drafting proposals on the procedure for using the above-named documents, and for submitting them for examination to the next meeting of the Council of the Heads of Governments of the CIS." It should be added to this that time is of essence, since after all, this has to do with elderly and, as a rule, ailing people. We will hope that there will be no problems in the procedure of using the documents, while on the other hand, the Agreement itself also provides wide

room for initiative, and for loving assistance to our veterans, no matter where in the former Union they may find themselves today.

#### **Withdrawal From Latvia Set for 31 August**

944D0027A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
4 May 94 p 3

[Report by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Sergey Knyazkov under the rubric "Events and Commentary": "Russian Troops Will Leave Latvia by 31 August 1994"]

[Text] Agreement on this matter was reached during the first official visit to the Russian Federation by Guntis Ulmanis, president of the Republic of Latvia.

I would remind you that initially the primarily working visit by Guntis Ulmanis was planned for 22 April. It was planned during the visit for the presidents of the two states to ratify a treaty and three agreements previously reached on the withdrawal of the troops and social protection for military pensioners. A 5 September order from the President of the Russian Federation on the establishment of Russian military bases within the CIS countries and the Republic of Latvia, however, (for "technical" errors for which Latvia apologized), provided the excuse for national radicals in the Latvian Sejm to postpone the visit by Ulmanis to Moscow and to remove from the package of accords the agreements on social protection for military pensioners. And the visit by the leader of the Baltic republic did not become a reality until 30 April, following coordination of a protocol on a previously initialed agreement on social protection for Russian military pensioners residing in Latvia. The protocol defines the obligations of the sides to establish social conditions which would promote the voluntary resettlement of military pensioners and their families from Latvia.

The main document signed by the presidents of the two countries in the Kremlin is a treaty on the terms, the schedule and the procedure for withdrawing the armed forces of the Russian Federation from the territory of Latvia and their legal status during the period of withdrawal, an inseparable part of which are the Agreement on the Legal Status of the Skrunda Radar Station During the Period of Its Temporary Operation and Dismantling, an agreement between the governments on social protection for military personnel of the armed forces of the Russian Federation, the Border Troops and their families temporarily residing within the territory of Latvia and their complete withdrawal, as well as an Agreement on Protection for Military Pensioners of the Russian Federation and Their Families Residing on the territory of the Republic of Latvia.

The treaty setting the withdrawal of Russian troops from Latvia for 31 August 1994, which includes 15 articles, underscores the fact that "the complete withdrawal of the armed forces of the Russian Federation embraces all persons belonging to the armed forces of the Russian Federation, their families and real property." The document states that "the withdrawal of individual subunits of the armed forces of the Russian Federation and the vacation and transfer of facilities are being conducted on schedule."

The treaty is subject to ratification by the parliaments of both states. Its interim application will begin the day the ratification certifications are exchanged.

Boris Yeltsin has called the visit by Guntis Ulmanis, president of the Republic of Latvia, "historic." He announced following the signing ceremony for the Russian-Latvian documents that "they were worked out with the complete agreement of the two sides." In the talks the Russian head of state directed special attention to the accord reached by the presidents of the two countries and the fact that "Russian Federation Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin will make a visit to Riga," during which Russian-Latvian economic cooperation will be expanded considerably.

Assessing the package of documents signed during the talks, Guntis Ulmanis noted that he regards them "as an integral whole, as a sad necessity bequeathed to us by history."

#### **Security Council Secretary Lobov Profiled**

PM1605124594 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian  
13 May 94 p 5

[Article by Irina Savvateyeva: "Yeltsin's Man"]

[Text] Oleg Ivanovich Lobov, to criticism and exposure of whom many brilliant pages of Russian journalism have been devoted, is a dramatic figure in the Russian political arena.

As often happens with people, his shortcomings have become an extension of his merits. The main ones evidently being his creative and selfless involvement with the matter assigned him and his directness and ability to remain loyal, whether to people or to ideas....

Born in Kiev in 1937, Lobov has always been proud that his family comes from an old cossack tribe and is mentioned in "Quiet Flows the Don" and that his uncle, an inhabitant of Veshenskaya village, once admitted Mikhail Sholokhov to the party.

The fate and career of Oleg Lobov himself were determined by a meeting with Boris Yeltsin. It happened in Sverdlovsk in 1971, where Lobov had then been working for 11 years after graduating from the Rostov railroad engineers institute. Oleg Ivanovich was the main engineer at a large institute with the lengthy title "Uralpromstroy-NIiprojekt" and was a candidate of technical sciences. And he looked like a "promising worker" to Yeltsin, who at that time headed the Sverdlovsk party oblast committee [obkom] construction department. Boris Nikolayevich offered the 34-year-old Lobov the post of his deputy although at that time the latter had served virtually no time at all in the party. In 1972 Oleg Ivanovich joined the party obkom. It was a brilliant launchpad.

Since then he has retained his irreproachable loyalty to his boss. So that if anyone is to be given the title "Yeltsin's man" then Oleg Ivanovich Lobov is obviously the first. Yeltsin himself who, according to eyewitnesses' accounts, is hypersensitive to any kind of betrayal, intrigue, and



plotting, has frequently stressed that he sees in Lobov not only a pragmatist and a strong economic leader but also a man he trusts. A man who could not stab him in the back.

From 1972 through to this day Lobov and Yeltsin have been walking through life arm in arm: Yeltsin became obkom secretary, Lobov became chief of the construction department and then chief of the country's biggest construction organization, "Glavstreduralstroy;" Yeltsin became first secretary, Lobov became secretary for construction and later chairman of the Sverdlovsk Oblast Soviet executive committee....

Probably the years spent in Sverdlovsk were the best time in Oleg Ivanovich Lobov's life. As they liked to say in the old days, they were glorious pages in his labor career which he is obviously not ashamed to mention to this day. At least he has left his mark in Sverdlovsk.

He was indeed a "strong economic leader" of the Soviet era. Actually, I do not know whether he was a "pragmatist." Perhaps rather he was a romantic, a man of enthusiasms.

What is in 1993 the offensive nickname of "chicken and egg" leader invented by journalists in the era of the big battle against Lobov as minister of the economy was in the second half of the eighties for Lobov, as chairman of the oblast soviet executive committee, simply an honorary title. And a deserved one. To this day people in Sverdlovsk, or Yekaterinburg, remember that under Lobov there were eggs and chickens and milk too. They say that in his office there was a huge map of the oblast showing "the dynamics of the increase in poultry and milk production" in various rayons and the oblast soviet executive committee chairman unswervingly kept track of these dynamics.

But Oleg Ivanovich's main hobbyhorse is undoubtedly construction. They say he was a good construction worker. He knew his job backwards and had passed through every level of "professional growth." When he was in Moscow, as an important man, he recalled with pride and seemingly a certain nostalgia: "Cultural and sports complexes were constructed for the first time in the country on the basis of my sketches." The first such complex was constructed in a village, which was remarkable at the time. It had everything: a pool, a volleyball pitch, football, amateur artistic activities, and even baths. What is curious is that this complex is still used for its purpose: People go there to wash....

As chairman of the oblast soviet executive committee Lobov came out with what for the time was a quite bold initiative: Giving city dwellers the right to buy houses in the countryside. Now young people will merely shrug—so what? But only seven or eight years ago this decision by the Sverdlovsk people alarmed Moscow. A special CPSU Central Committee commission arrived to investigate and closely "studied the question" and eventually kindly agreed it should be supported. A special CPSU Central Committee decree was published, after which Lobov embarked on the construction of cottages. An experimental settlement was installed near Sverdlovsk consisting

of houses with every comfort and with auxiliary premises which, they say, were beautifully executed. To this day the entire local elite lives there.

It is indicative that Lobov was eager to repeat this successful experiment and he began to speak enthusiastically of a further 38 settlements. But like the majority of reforming ideas in the era of socialism, this one was overtaken by an inevitable fate: It was implemented in a strictly limited number of examples. Or to be more precise in just one case.

At the same time youth housing complex construction reached impressive scales in Sverdlovsk and considerable credit went to Lobov here. Or rather to Yeltsin and Lobov. In general all Oleg Ivanovich's progressive initiatives saw the light largely thanks to the fact that he had Yeltsin's support. Often the initiative itself came from Yeltsin.

Recalling today Oleg Ivanovich's activity in Sverdlovsk one cannot fail to mention the best supermarket in the oblast, the idea for which came from the executive committee chairman; the modernization of old Urals plants; the swift installation of gas compressor stations; the brick plants which, although he did not manage to install them in every rayon, as he wished, he nonetheless managed to construct in some quantity; and, pardon me for mentioning them, the excellent Sverdlovsk toilets. Incidentally, all of Lobov lies in the story of the toilets.

At one time he had traveled to Mexico or Italy where he had familiarized himself with the production of these necessary items. After which he returned home and called in the director of a ceramics plant and gave him a real dressing down for producing poor-quality toilets. Local inhabitants assert that from then to this day they have made good toilets....

So was Lobov a reformer? Probably there is no one answer to that question. One thing is perhaps undoubted and that is that this man was very sensitive to... how to put it more precisely, to the requirements of the time, perhaps to the market situation? Obviously both are correct.

They say that in the days of classic party leadership Lobov was a real party boss—an inaccessible demigod. When the era of wide-scale democracy began Oleg Ivanovich became a very big democrat. When there was the cooperative boom Lobov enthusiastically supported the "shoots of the new." And when Moscow began to criticize the cooperatives' get-rich-quick members Oleg Ivanovich immediately restructured himself.

I do not want to make mischief here. That was how the party raised people. Be prepared! Always prepared! Today you have been sent to build youth housing complexes and cooperatives, tomorrow to bury money at the bottom of irrigation channels. You must! And loyal soldiers of the kind that Oleg Ivanovich Lobov undoubtedly is will put all their efforts into organizing the digging. They will set up an optimum work schedule, organize hot lunches for the workers, and where necessary even take hold of a spade themselves....

In 1987 on instructions from Yeltsin, who was already working in Moscow at the time, Lobov became deputy chairman of the Russian Council of Ministers. They say he was viewed with great sympathy there. It was a time of general discord, a time of a disorderly work style. And in this situation, when emergency, anticrisis decisions frequently had to be taken, Lobov was not equal to the task.

Moreover, in that government he almost looked like the most zealous reformer. At least to my journalist colleagues working at the time Lobov seemed the most progressive man in the government: He spoke more than anyone about the market, he supported youth housing complexes and in general everything new and progressive. For instance, he preached what was then a terrible heresy: Specialists should be sent to Germany to buy housing construction plants and then a "mass cottage industry" should be set up in Russia with the aid of these plants. In general Lobov's press conferences at which journalists were spoken to in human language were an event at the time, in the era of universal secrecy.

Oleg Ivanovich looked good in 1989-1991 in Armenia, where he was sent immediately after the earthquake as leader of the restoration work staff. After a while he became second secretary of the Armenian Communist Party Central Committee.

And in April 1991 at Yeltsin's initiative Lobov was appointed first deputy chairman of the Russian Council of Ministers.

His short stay—scarcely more than six months—in that post was marked by the stormy events of August. During which, eyewitnesses assert, Oleg Ivanovich behaved with dignity. It is universally known that he was assigned leadership of the "reserve" government in exile.

But when the time came for balanced rational work to reform the economy Oleg Lobov felt uncomfortable. In the fall of 1991, when Silayev had just been dismissed and Gaydar had not yet been appointed, he was left in charge of the economy. And imagine: Everything was collapsing, disintegrating, ties were breaking down, enterprises were coming to a standstill, but Lobov was discussing at a government session the question of... procurements of conifer branches to feed livestock. Observers believe that it was then that he failed—like the Swede at Poltava [reference to defeat of King Charles XII of Sweden by Peter the Great in the battle of Poltava].

Yeltsin obviously understood this. When Gaydar's team appeared on the horizon and the question of a change of course arose, there was no place in the government for Oleg Ivanovich. He himself explained the situation like this: "New people have come who want to work in a new way, I do not want to make them nervous with my presence." But to all appearances if anyone was nervous then it was primarily Oleg Lobov himself, whom the young reformers obviously did not want to take on as a mentor. Concealed hurt could be heard in the words uttered after Gaydar's men had been dropped: "What was the Gaydar

team's mistake? They should have relied on experienced cadres and then the young men's energy would have had a reliable cover."

But that is highly doubtful. When Lobov returned from the council of experts which he had headed while Gaydar was the top man in the government and joined the cabinet of ministers now headed by Chernomyrdin, he became virtually the number one enemy of liberal market reforms.

Oleg Lobov, first deputy premier and minister of the economy, became widely known to the public concerned for his norm-creating activity. And primarily as the author of two impressive works: the draft president's edict "on the Russian Federation Ministry of the Economy" (May 1993) and the analytical memorandum "on the economic situation in the country" (August 1993). The imposing and threatening nature of these works contains all Oleg Lobov's cossack nature. When the sabers are unsheathed the Russian Ministry of the Economy will become "the leading central organ of federal executive power." Lobov eagerly arrogates to his department many functions of the State Committee for the Administration of State Property, the Ministry of Finance, the central Bank, the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations, and other departments. His instructions are compulsory for all regional authorities.... His first deputies are equal to ministers "in terms of remuneration conditions and material and consumer and medical services...." In all Lobov tried to arrogate to himself in the heat of his lawmaking at least half of all the economic and sociocultural powers which the law on the Council of Ministers assigns to the government.

The program which Oleg Ivanovich was eager to implement with these powers was distinguished by the drastic intensification of state regulation of the economy. The tax system was to be reviewed: The state was to be given the opportunity not only to lay claim to taxes but also to the revenue of enterprises with a share of state property. Privatization was also to be reviewed: There was to be a reduction from 80 percent to 30 percent in the proportion of state and municipal property handed over in exchange for privatization vouchers....

Oleg Ivanovich defended these ideas of his as selflessly and enthusiastically as he had once defended the ideas of youth housing complexes, cottage construction, and brick plants. The press pulled him to pieces, turning Lobov into a simply odious figure. It is said that when Oleg Ivanovich yet again tried with unfeigned enthusiasm to preach his ideas at government session, a rumble went round the auditorium. Even Mr. Zaveryukha looked quite sane compared to Lobov. Eventually in September 1993 Oleg Lobov was honorably removed from the economy: He was appointed secretary of the Russian Security Council.

In considering this inglorious and dramatic page in Oleg Ivanovich Lobov's history you can make several hypotheses. Experts believe that the drastic increase in the activity of "Yeltsin's man" could only have been sanctioned by the president. Thus Yeltsin was sounding out the possibility of retreating from the reforms after the Russian Supreme Soviet had voiced its lack of confidence in

Gaydar in December 1992 and removed him from the management of the economy. Lobov's resignation in September 1993 was a concession to the "monetarists" fighting him not for life but to the death, when the president needed their support again in the late summer and early fall. When the idea of constitutional reform ripened, when all public opinion polls showed unequivocally that if the president were to dissolve parliament then the people would not lift a finger.

In addition virtually the entire government at the time was interested in Lobov's resignation. Fedorov and Chubays because of the obvious contradiction in views of economic policy. The premier and his henchmen because of apparatus considerations: Chernomyrdin had absolutely no need for the close presence of a man laying claim to a considerable proportion of the powers of the premier himself.

But I would not present Oleg Lobov as a kind of unfortunate victim of the political struggle. His rise and fall in 1993 were ultimately by no means the consequence of the president's political games or the premier's bureaucratic intriguing (although there undoubtedly were games and intriguing). Rather they were the natural outcome of the next stage in the country's historical development. A stage at which managers like Oleg Lobov were quite unable to hold commanding heights in the economy.

One newspaper wrote at the time: "Oleg Lobov has the image and personal qualities of a typical representative of the former party and economic nomenklatura and whatever he does, however he tries to look like a 'market man,' his style and manner will remain those of an inveterate representative of the administrative-edict system. And nothing can be done about that. The man will not be able to change his skin in his maturity."

Today Oleg Lobov holds the "honorable" post of Security Council secretary. This work is hardly to his liking. He himself has repeatedly stressed and seemingly quite sincerely: I am not a politician, I am an economic manager. And now, on the anti-Chubays wave raised by Yuriy Luzhkov, Lobov continues to defend his views of privatization. But the Security Council is in no haste to study the economy and, people in the know say, are quietly grumbling about their new boss.

What next?

Lobov will not break through to power like Yuriy Skokov. Because he does not know how. During his entire time in leading posts Oleg Ivanovich has not cobbled together any "support group": He simply did not engage in it. There are no lobby structures behind him. No "initiative group" of interested political "chess players" will gamble on him because what kind of a chess game is it when everyone can clearly see on hundred moves ahead: Lobov is Yeltsin's man. And in general playing political chess is not in the nature of this heir of the Don cossacks.

Experts believe that if there is a military coup tomorrow (I stress—this is a purely hypothetical suggestion, there are no real grounds for it, and it does not lay the slightest claim to the "number three story") and if Yeltsin were to go

abroad, he would leave the country not to Chernomyrdin but to Lobov. The former, a pragmatic man, who has always had his personal interests in sight, will find a common language with the putschists and will make compromises. The latter will shoot it out to the last but will not surrender Yeltsin.

And the experts also say that if Chernomyrdin drives the country into hyperinflation and Yeltsin decides to take full economic power into his own hands—he will put Lobov in the government in order to neutralize it but always to have it to hand and to feel calm about it.

God forbid we live to see such options....

### Review of Military Reform

944D0023A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
6 May 94 p 2

[Article by Anatoliy Dokuchayev: "The Russian Army: Footnote to Assessments and Conclusions"]

[Text] The Creation of the Russian Armed Forces began on May 7, 1992

### Military Review

Judging from the many press articles, the Russian Army is today the focus of attention of experts and analysts both Russian and foreign. Their assessments strongly diverge. Some believe that the Russian Armed Forces pose a threat to the security of some neighboring states, while others conclude that the Russian military is today incapable of performing its mission of protecting the Fatherland. There are many opinions, but only one truth. What is it then?

Before that, a word about one assessment, that of the President. He believes that the Russian Armed Forces are presently combat-ready and as a whole are accomplishing their assigned missions. That is what it says in the presidential Message to the Federal Assembly.

But now, let us distance ourselves for a time from the official assessment and conclusions of various independent and dependent experts and analysts, and let us try to see, through the prism of factual material, what baggage the Russian Army has carried with it to its two-year anniversary. Here then are the facts.

In the Russian Army, basic reliance is placed on the Strategic Nuclear Forces (SYaS), which deter an aggressor from unleashing large-scale wars against Russia, and no less importantly, allow us to reorganize the General-Purpose Forces. Undoubtedly one can speak of existing difficulties encountered in the Russian SYaS. In the Strategic Rocket Forces (RVSN), for example, today they are doing the difficult job of withdrawing missile units from the territories of Belarus and Kazakhstan. But there is no reason to doubt the combat capacity of the Russian SYaS and their readiness to perform the mission assigned to them. Incidentally, dozens of journalists who were invited to the ceremony assigning three missile regiments, armed with the mobile RS-12M (Topol) missile systems, to the RVSN were convinced of this just recently.



The General Purpose Forces have also been transformed in these two years. Today, in the military lexicon it is increasingly rare to hear regrets being voiced about the fact that the best troops, the troops of the border districts of yesterday's still-united power have been left in the rear abroad. And this is primarily because the Russian western districts, the Northern Caucasus, Moscow and Leningrad districts, are being qualitatively transformed.

And one other thing about the new quality of the General-Purpose Forces: The principle of mobile defense, which was made the basis for creation of the troop groupings (it presupposes the availability of small but adequately strong forces ready for operational use wherever there is a real threat to Russian security) has acquired tangible outlines. The active creation of Mobile Forces, as a new inter-service operational-strategic formation of the Russian Army, has begun.

**Reform year 1994.** In order to create qualitatively new Armed Forces which meet the demands of the present military-political situation in the world and their tendencies of development, and [correspond to] the real degree of military danger to Russia, in 1994 the main tasks will be:

- continuation of the development of troop (force) groupings and infrastructure on the territory of the Russian Federation
- conclusion of the withdrawal of troops (forces) to the territory of Russia
- creation of Mobile Forces
- conduct of research to justify the structure, composition and numerical strength of the Armed Forces for the period after 1995
- development of a concept of development of the RF Armed Forces from 1996 to the year 2000 and in the future up to the year 2005.

Another fact. Despite the costs incurred by the start of the development of the Armed Forces and the grave economic situation of the country, questions of combat readiness and operational and mobilization training were resolved with rare persistence and consistency. In 1993, according to official statements, the Russian Army moved to a new system of combat readiness. After this came a chain of major exercises and training sessions at the strategic level. These were conducted by the Minister of Defense and his deputies. To name just a few: the command-staff exercises "Zapad," "Tsenter," and "Vostok," the strategic training sessions to repel an aerospace attack, and in command and control of the SYaS and the Armed Forces as a whole. Around 100 operational exercises and training sessions were conducted under the leadership of the CINCs of the Armed Services and the commanders of military districts and fleets. Operational and mobilization training were directed toward assimilation of the new system of combat readiness and the newly developed operational plans of the troops and naval forces.

**Reform Year 1994.** The most important task is maintaining units and tactical formations in combat readiness and combat capability at a level ensuring the protection of the

**state under any conditions, and accomplishment of the tasks defined by the Basic Provisions of Military Doctrine.**

In the four months of 1994, the plans for training of troops and naval forces were basically accomplished. Two command-staff training sessions were held at the strategic level, more than ten command-staff training sessions at the operational-strategic level, and the regional command-staff exercises "Baykal" and "Severo-Zapad" were held.

Before the end of the training year, plans are to conduct one training session in command and control of the Strategic Nuclear Forces, and a number of front command-staff exercises and the operational-rear exercise "Zapad."

These exercises help prevent a reduction in the level of combat readiness, promote proficiency of the troops and naval forces and coordination of the command and control elements and troops withdrawn to Russian territory to new garrison points.

The Russian Army is demonstrating its combat capacity not only in exercises. Its units and tactical formations are successfully accomplishing peacekeeping functions in accordance with the international obligations of our country. Two separate Russian battalions are helping to keep the peace in Yugoslavia. Units of the 201st Motorized Rifle Division, garrisoned in Tajikistan, are participating with the Collective Peacekeeping Forces in guarding and defending the Tajik-Afghan border and the most important economic installations; in patrolling, escorting columns with humanitarian cargoes, and acting as a guarantor of peace and security in the region. There are peacekeeping efforts of Russian subunits in Pridnestrovye, South Ossetia, and Abkhazia. A total of more than 16 thousand service members have been put into action in the "hot spots."

These examples are just a fraction of the components that go into the combat capacity of the Russian Army and the degree of work that has been done in two years to reform the units and tactical formations inherited from the USSR Armed Forces. Let me focus the attention of the reader on this point. Today there is a lot of talk about the great manpower shortage of subunits and units, which affects their combat capability. Today this is problem number one. But paradoxical as it may seem, it is being resolved. The manning of the subunits has increased in two years, and is currently at around the 65% level. And this while the existing legislation allows the drafting of scarcely more than 20% of conscripts.

This breakthrough became possible because reliance was put in time on a mixed manning system, by contract and conscription. At present there are more than 160 thousand professionals in uniform.

**Reform Year 1994:** The draft remains the basis of manning. However, around 80% of young men have legal grounds for exemption or deferment from conscription (in other states they are no more than 20-30% of conscripts). For this reason, there are high hopes in the program for manning the army and navy with contract service members.

**In 1994, 150 thousand professionals will be selected, of them 14 thousand women.**

In speaking of the Russian Army today, one must say that its development and the course of military reform as a whole are associated with many difficulties which are objective in nature. Thus, the creation of troop groupings is directly linked to the laborious task of withdrawing units and tactical formations to the territory of Russia. (In 1993, for example, more than 100 thousand service members were withdrawn, more than 5 thousand pieces of armored equipment and artillery systems, and around 700 combat planes and helicopters). The withdrawal of units and formations requires their accommodation and creation of new elements of the infrastructure. What is the result? Despite the fact that the withdrawal of troops is being implemented according to plan, in accordance with the schedules that were devised, it is significantly outstripping the rate of [troop] accommodation. While in 1992 there were 98 thousand service families lacking apartments, today there are more than 120 thousand. These figures cannot be heard without pain. Not only are apartments in short supply, but also the corresponding elements of the infrastructure, academic, material and technical facilities, and much else.

The leadership of the Armed Forces aims to prevent a critical military-technical and technological lag behind the developed states of the world in the main areas of development of military equipment. Despite this fact, because of the cut in the military budget, the purchases of the latest weapon models have been reduced. Here, it is not irrelevant to point out that, as was noted at a press conference by the Defense Minister, General of the Army Pavel Grachev, today the Russian Army allows itself only those expenses without which it cannot get along, and which are associated with supporting the activity of the troops and personnel. There have been substantial changes in the structure of the military budget, and its tendency toward reorientation in the direction of the social sphere is clearly evident.

Reorientation of the military budget is not a tribute to fashion, but is a forced measure associated with tight financing—especially since it is necessary to accomplish a truly state-level task, safeguarding the prestige of serving in the Armed Forces. As you know, our Army has always drawn its strength from its people. Approaches toward accomplishing this task today are defined, and consist in an able combination of legislative means, financial and material incentives, and propaganda and educational measures. While the approaches have been determined, the main work lies ahead.

Problems, difficulties, problems. There are many of them. But for all that, it seems to me that the Russian Army has arrived at its second anniversary as an army which is gathering combat might, an army capable of accomplishing its mission of defending the Russian state.

### **Army Reform Seen Beyond Political Control**

FM1805120194 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA  
in Russian 17 May 94 First Edition pp 1-2

[Article by Vladimir Dudnik: "The Army Cannot Be Outside Politics. At Any Rate During a Time of Social Crisis"]

[Text] Over the last two years the Army has played a crucial role in Russian history on two occasions. And on both occasions experts made the same mistake—they avoided public analysis and assessment of what happened. In August 1991, intoxicated by victory, as it were. And in October 1993, supposedly scared of it. But were they victories? It is impossible to understand the Army's role in society's crisis development without answering this question.

### **Prologue**

Over the last seven or eight years there has been a change in the nature of our society's development: From normal political evolution we ended up—via a phase of virtually normal political struggle—with overt confrontation and even, here and there, civil war. And the definite stance espoused by the Army has matched every phase.

Initially (until February-March 1989) the Army remained outwardly neutral and monolithic, although this was only an appearance. It continued, as it were, to reflect the interests of all society. In actual fact this was a period where conflict phenomena covertly developed and accumulated within it.

In February 1988 then premier Nikolay Ryzhkov was forced to accept the existence of vertical stratification within the Armed Forces. Thus, intra-Army problems and flaws found themselves the center of public attention. And that fall the civilian press raised the problems of military reform. In effect this marked the beginning of a fight for the Army between society and the authorities.

The tragedy in Tbilisi occurred 9 April 1989: The official authorities in confrontation with the people furtively used the Army. And then came Vilnius, Baku, Sumgait, and Dushanbe and the Airborne Troops' "potato maneuvers...." There were signs all around that the authorities were endeavoring to embarrass the Army and place society and it on different sides of the barricades (and barricades were already a fact in society).

A military "formation demonstration" took place on Moscow's Manege Square 23 February 1990. An "Appeal to the People" was adopted at the bidding of the Main Military-Political Directorate of the USSR Armed Forces, containing the following words: "A resolute 'no' to attempts to slander the Army and depict it as a force opposing the people." But a month later the authorities themselves overtly pitted the Army against the people: The Army was brought out with its hardware to surround the Kremlin 28 March in front of a 500,000-strong people's demonstration.

From that moment on controversy began in the mass media regarding the possibility of a military coup. In response the ruling top brass accused the mass media of inflammatory attempts to demoralize the Army.

This was the atmosphere in the country by August 1991. The Soviet authorities attempted 19-21 August to rout the radical civilian opposition by overtly relying on the Army. The Army, however, sabotaged the orders that it was given by the authorities, giving the outward appearance of keeping neutral. But even if you believe that the Army just found itself outside politics, as it were, that too was a bold political choice on its part. And tantamount to its joining the democratic camp. This choice brought about the Russian reformers' victory.

### En Route to October

The truth, however, was that the crisis in society had not been overcome. What is more, it escalated still further and increasingly took hold of the Army. Following the breakup of the USSR the latter too began to spontaneously break up. This was accompanied by a quite uncontrollable, if urgently disguised process that saw Army involvement in regional armed conflicts. And spring 1992 marked the beginning of a virtually undisguised tussle over the Army between the Supreme Soviet and the executive.

Certain events over the next 18-24 months were crucial for the moral and professional state and the subsequent position of the Soviet Army (and it is the Soviet Army that we are talking about, since virtually all its generic features are to a considerable extent retained).

First its legal recognition as Russia's Army. In effect this was the enactment of the choice that it had already made in August 1991. Then came vigorous steps on the part of the president to rehabilitate the Army morally and ethically and to boost servicemen's social status and improve their material position.

Early in March 1993 President Yeltsin had a meeting in camera with supreme command personnel. It is now clear from B. Yeltsin's memoirs that they discussed the Army's future position in a situation of growing political crisis.

In the April referendum the Army's choice was not proclaimed, but it nevertheless became known that 72 percent of the military backed the president's policy. That enabled Boris Yeltsin to say shortly afterward: The Army is the guarantor of state stability. In effect this indicated the place and role played by the Armed Forces in the nationwide conflict.

However, this was shortly countered by an idea that appeared out of nowhere—"the Army is outside politics." The cultivation of this idea within the Army almost played a fatal role during the overt confrontation between the Communist-Soviet political system and the executive's post-totalitarian regime that began 21 September [1993].

I think that in essence this was the antithesis of the recent past, which espoused the unqualified ideological principle that the Army has no internal functions even though everyone knew that this was a lie. The "Red-Soviet" Army was systematically used to ensure the internal stability of the Communist regime.

This hypocrisy and deception could not last long. It was bound to come to an end. And that happened in October.

### A Victory?

Everything that happened during October is horrifying, speaking in ordinary human terms. But in the harsh language found in a review of events, the scale of what happened and the number of casualties enable these events to be ranked as a low-intensity, local armed conflict. And the damage done during it can be regarded as acceptable. That is the case, ridiculous as it may sound.

However, all this should and could have been prevented, even in conditions where the idea of the Army's role in maintaining internal state stability had not been formalized *de jure*. But during the most critical hours the leadership of the Armed Forces played a waiting game. Even later on it did not make use of the full scale of degrees of using force in a civil conflict. And that scale is broad, with many subdivisions. It includes making an unambiguous advance statement of position; threatening the threat [as published] of force; directly threatening the use of force; making a show of intent; using limited components of force for effect, etc—this is what the range of measures is like.

But in order to feel confident about using this range of measures, the Army leadership should have had a clear ideological principle prior to the events of October: The Army cannot be outside politics, and at critical moments the Army should be under one-man command and obey the constitutional commander in chief. The Army leadership did not have this clear ideological principle, and therefore at the critical moment immediately switched to the scenario involving tanks and shooting.

Needless to say, force was certainly used to provide the requisite defense of the state system. But in a very clumsy manner, and after the Army leadership had not had dialogue with society for a very long time and had shown dogged reluctance to present any arguments other than those that were last-minute and extreme in their intensity.

Needless to say, force of argument (eschewing the latter argument up to a certain point) is the only thing that can and should keep the social situation under control in the long term. However, at times of political crisis either arguments are lacking or they fail to work. And people behind a crisis tend to be deliberately unwilling to hear and see them. That is what happened in September and October 1993.

But even if society wants to evolve in its chosen direction, the authorities should at least keep control of the situation. It is in these cases that the argument of force replaces the force of argument. In Moscow 3-4 October 1993 it was not merely a political victory and temporary civil stabilization that was achieved by military means. Civil war was averted, and that could have been followed by global armed conflict.

People claim that in October the Army could with an equal degree of probability have ended up on any side depending on the command.

In conditions whereby the Army is in a state of unstable political equilibrium and its position depends on the personal choice made by its sole commander, who has the right to give it orders (in this case, Pavel Grachev), this might have happened. But only in theory. In practice



everything was determined by the alignment of forces and interests in society and the fact that the "White House inmates" had been utterly discredited morally and politically. In this context its choice was preordained. This was the culmination of the Army's choice in August 1991.

It did not use force against its own people then. Now it used force to defend the people's fundamental interests. To put it in extreme terms, it was a question of preventing global civil war.

#### A Defeat?

Victory was not followed by civil peace. Everything that divided people when they were killing one another has not only remained in society but has worsened the situation still further.

Having secured victory for the politicians, the Army suffered a "defeat." It did not succeed in being the arbiter in the civil dispute and the guarantor of state stability. It fell hostage to the winning side.

Nor has the potential threat to the authorities posed by this Army been removed. On the one hand, it has become conscious of its own indisputable strength and in this connection its own exclusivity in this state system. On the other, the following question has not been removed: What will the Army do if the authorities it supports prove unviable in civil organizational development? Whereas 10 tanks settled everything in October, another 10 (or perhaps more) could turn up if only their commander is sure that there is an individual who will be able to make better use of the fruits of his labors than the people in power at the moment. There are still enough forces interested in these same tanks but with different commanders and people.

The 12 December elections not only confirmed this, but at the same time demonstrated the true sympathies of the post-October Army.

The Defense Ministry and the Central Electoral Commission kept the results of the Army's voting secret. However, the president admitted that a third of the Army voted for Zhirinovskiy.

The results of the 12 December 1993 voting do not merely reflect the profound crisis in which the current Army finds itself. They represent defeat for the democratic choice that it made in August 1991. Its current choice may quite possibly be the prologue to the general defeat of democracy in Russia.

#### The Last Bastion of the Soviets

Appealing to his compatriots the day after the Soviet armed putsch was put down, the Russian president promised the people "full military reform." Instead of that, a month later he produced military doctrine.

The military doctrine, written by gung ho Afghan generals, not only made no reference to the term "military reform" but contained none of the key formulas—civilian control of the defense sphere, a civilian defense ministry, an open, structurally-improved defense budget, and a professional army.

To make up for that it harbored the possibility of a fresh wave of economic militarization and Russia's transformation into a military police state. Let us recall just two episodes.

A month after the Security Council adopted the military doctrine the president made a peacemaking trip to the North Caucasus. During this trip Pavel Grachev issued the following tough statement: If it is necessary to use the Army to pacify the region, he, the defense minister, would do so. And a month later, this January, in response to the detention in Latvia of two generals, without authorization the commander of the Northwest Group of Forces put the divisions under his command on combat alert. And the Airborne Troops did the same.

Thus the ruling top brass are wilfully sending draftees to die outside the Fatherland in breach of Russian laws and are opening the way for the legal use of mercenary troops and the semilegal transfer of armored vehicles, heavy weapons, and munitions to the warring countries of the former USSR. In return they have gotten local civil wars.

Nor is military reform working out. Are some of the current generals contemplating further sabotaging reforms? With their complete power, they have all the means at their disposal on which the Supreme Soviet relied as it was losing power. The temptation is great. They have presidents available. The appropriate entry is there in the doctrine.

The ruling state elite cannot be unaware of all this.

It will not prove possible to keep the Army in its present state for long. It is also impossible to radically reform it, since the authorities have handed the business of transforming the Army over to the military elite themselves. The ruling top brass will not permit full-scale military reform because that would spell the end of their absolute power. Yet the military elite cannot now be replaced. That would automatically mean blaming it for the Army's involvement in the Moscow conflict. That would not really be right; what is more, it would be simply very dangerous.

Consequently we are "condemned" to a certain pause in Army reform. It should be followed by a scene-change, most likely a multiple change, which will also clear the stage for the next historical act.

## AIR, AIR DEFENSE FORCES

### Journalist Visit to PVO Command Center

94UM0404A Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI  
in Russian No 65, 12 Apr 94 p 2

[Article by Vladimir Chuprin under the "Reporting" rubric: "PVO Reveals Secrets"; first paragraph is ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI introduction]

[Text] The underground casemates of the Moscow Military District's PVO [air defense] command center are reminiscent of a skillfully wound wire. Endless stairways and secluded corners unexpectedly terminate in enormous rooms, where pilot lights and instruments flicker in mysterious darkness. Then there are more stairways, passageways, and heavy, massive doors.

"Our command center began operating on 30 November 1981," said Lieutenant General P. Kuznetsov, chief of staff of the MO [Moscow District] PVO. "It cost the government at that time 74 million rubles."

We headed for the combat control room - the holy of holies of the command center. The plotting boards, charts, and maps illuminated in the darkness could at any time supply the military personnel with literally all the data.

A monitor screen displayed a weather report pertaining to military airfields. For example, it was shown that at Bologoye there were a haze, calm, humidity of 95 percent, and visibility of 300 meters. P. Kuznetsov gave the command for a report on the air situation on the northern borders of Russia. There was an immediate change in the size of the map, which showed in large scale the Leningrad Oblast area, with two aircraft flying from Scandinavia in that direction.

While we watched the moving electronic spots, an air defense crew located somewhere near Vyborg had already taken up its combat stations. But what was the story? The new instructions forbid knocking down foreign air liners and sports craft that violate Russia's air space. However, the brigade staff command post operations officer has the authority to give the command to destroy a military "pirate." He is not required to obtain permission from the state's top persons to do this.

"Many people do not believe that in this economically difficult time we are able to maintain a high state of combat readiness," said Colonel General A. Kornukov, district commander. "But that really is so. Eighty percent of our troops received the good or excellent evaluation in last year's combat preparation rating. In the concluding exercises, more than 100 aerial targets entered our zone at various altitudes and speeds, and all were "destroyed." The men are provided with uniforms, footwear, and food rations. Our military pilots—the only ones in Russia—were able to put in 100 percent of the time called for in the training programs. Ninety-five percent of the air defense regiments are armed with the new S-300 missiles."

Indeed, the PVO troops cannot be said to be a stepchild of the government. This is easily seen by looking at the Moscow District. The staff command post in which we were located, although the main one, is definitely not the only one in the district. Under extreme conditions, any one of the five reserve command posts can take on the function of troop command and control.

It is true that, in the opinion of military specialists, there is no chance whatsoever that the above situation will obtain. The fortification secrets of underground structures are such that the command post is reliably protected against all types of weapons of mass destruction. Even in the case—God forbid!—an enemy's nuclear bomb would score a direct hit on the site, this would not harm a single hair on the heads of the officers and generals as they perform the 24-hour watch. The combat control room, automatic warning system computing facility, and the communications center are capable of 10 days more in automatic operation. The bunker's reinforced concrete walls are filled

with metal shells mounted on special cables and shock absorbers. These constructions prevent soil displacement even in case of a substantial explosion.

Military persons would not be surprised if told that it would not be a bad idea to have this kind of stronghold within the population's civil defense system. You and I know that potatoes for plant dining halls have long been stored in puny bomb shelters. They are much cheaper for enterprise workers in the fall than in spring when purchased in stores.

Well, the above is incidental to the story. What kind of service are PVO men performing now, and which traditions are they observing and promoting? The MO "lost" 100 large units last year. However, this is in no way a tragedy. Troop reformation is to continue, and it seems that it is impossible to ignore the Suvorov instruction "skill, not numbers" by hiding behind thick walls of a bastion.

Nonetheless, it cannot be said that hanging over the heads of district units and subunits is a mortal danger of mass discharges into the reserves, something which is frequently stated in newspapers. Rumors of elimination of the "defensive rings" around Moscow are grossly exaggerated, according to the military authorities.

The chief slogan used by Russian airborne troops is "no one other than we." For missilemen, this is "who if not we." This is how the PVO generals feel, referring to the military action experience in Iraq, where the Americans' successful air offensive was decisive in securing victory for them.

The Moscow District is capable of launching missiles against 500 targets at the same time. It would be foolish, even criminal, to dissolve this kind of army branch, considering that only a single cruise missile reaching its target would be capable of inflicting upon the national economy a severe lesson. Also, the MO is watching over 1.3 million square kilometers of Russia, eight nuclear power stations, and about 140 installations considered to be special.

The above supertasks compel missilemen to keep their powder dry. Formation of a professional army is still something for the future. And filling the manpower needs by voluntary recruitment only leaves much to be desired.

In a word, summer is drawing near, and with it the PVO men's new evaluation launchings against practice targets. This is something for which they are ready at all hours of the day and night at Anino. But what about other missile and radar stations distributed over an enormous area? One can only hope that only training alerts will be sounded there.

#### **New Airborne Training Center in Saratov Oblast** *944D0031A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian* *29 Apr 94 p 2*

[Article by Captain Vladimir Mokhov: "Airborne Landing in Volga Region: New Service Addresses"]

[Text] Until recently the residents of this rayon center in Saratov Oblast never saw a group of troops larger than five officers from the local military commissariat. Now an entire airborne regiment has entered the city.

It is basically made up of officers and warrant officers of an airborne training center transferred to the Lvov area.

Following the breakup of the armed forces of the USSR, they decided they wanted to serve in Russia. The Airborne Troops arrived in the Volga region practically with only their suitcases. And a desire to establish the same kind of training center there. They wrote a letter to that effect to the minister of defense and the commander of the Airborne Troops. Their voices were heard. The date 16 October 1992 can be considered to be the birth date of a new training center for Russia's Airborne Troops.

They did not have to begin from scratch. In the first place, the backbone of the regiment—the battalion and company commanders and administrative personnel—remained the same. In the second place, the city, rayon and oblast leadership immediately established business contacts. The matters of deploying the regiment, allocating land plots, the construction of the materials and equipment base, and so forth, were resolved without a hitch.

The military post is gradually acquiring its regular shape. It is still necessary, however, to build and equip a training ground 40 kilometers from the post and to restore the former basis for the reclamation battalion, which has become practically unusable. According to the most modest estimates, this will require more than a billion rubles.

There is the same kind of problem with housing. For now the officers' families are scattered throughout the city. It is not such a problem to rent an apartment at acceptable rent in the rayon center, to be sure. At the end of last year many of them celebrated housewarmings in the first, 100-apartment building built for the Airborne Troops. And construction rates should not decrease this year. According to Colonel Valeriy Shevchuk, the unit commander, the command element of the Volga Military District is providing considerable assistance along with the city authorities.

And what about the regiment's main purpose, the training of specialists for the Airborne Troops? Right now only the permanent staff is engaging in planned combat training. The proper equipment and materials base is lacking for training cadets. The most immediate prospect is for the end of 1994. The Airborne Troops plan by that time to establish the essential conditions for deploying one of the training battalions, conducting the first recruitment and setting about the planned training of specialists. If there are no problems with the financing, this mission should be fulfilled.

The regiment is trying not lose its professional skills. The officers, warrant officers and contract specialists (most of whom are local residents) have completed the annual program of parachute drops. And so, the light-blue Airborne beret has apparently been firmly established in the interior of this small city near the Volga.

## NAVAL FORCES

### Submarine Fleet Said Not To Be Combat Ready

94UM0408B Moscow MOSKOVSKIY  
KOMSO MOLETS in Russian 26 Mar 94 pp 1-2

[Article by Dmitriy Kholodov: "Admiral Chernavin's 'Submarines': Russia Has No Submarine Fleet?"]

[Text] The editorial office of MOSKOVSKIY KOMSO MOLETS has a memorandum prepared in 1992 by Russian Military Counterintelligence and signed by Nikolay Golushko, former chief of the Federal Counterintelligence Service. Stamped "Top Secret", it unequivocally admits that Russia's submarine fleet is not combat effective:

"The noise level of nuclear-powered submarines in the USSR Navy is 20-30 times higher than those of the Americans, and the effectiveness of domestic sonar equipment is more than 25 times as inferior. Due to these reasons, the U.S. Navy has achieved a capability of detecting Soviet nuclear-powered submarines with a probability of 0.95 and is able to monitor more than 75 percent of the area of strategically important areas of the world oceans. The USSR KGB has repeatedly (Nos 3/8/2458-79 and 3/6/2166-88) informed the levels of authority and the Main Military Procurement about this situation in the field of nuclear-powered submarine shipbuilding, but no positive changes followed."

In the 1960's, the Americans began reducing the noise level of their submarines, sacrificing everything. In order to make nuclear-powered submarines invulnerable, we began increasing the speed and depth of their submerging: We strengthened the hull in order to withstand an enemy torpedo strike, as if making an ironclad instead of a submarine.

"Events of recent years show that having achieved strategic superiority, the U.S. Navy is intensifying it despite our country's real technical and material capabilities to eliminate it. In this situation, in the opinion of a wide range of experts, the main responsibility falls on the military-industrial complex, the Ministry of the Shipbuilding Industry, and also the leadership of the Navy, who in the late 1970's and early 1980's gave the leadership of the country and the USSR Ministry of Defense a false presentation of ways to achieve acoustics equality of third-generation domestic nuclear-powered submarines with nuclear-powered submarines of the U.S. Navy just by replacing auxiliary mechanisms without changing their architecture and design as a whole. The actual causes of the high noise level of Soviet nuclear-powered submarines were ignored."

Military counterintelligence worked in vain. This memorandum was not useful to anyone. In an interview with KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, the commander in chief of the Navy recently stated that "a laying-down of the lead ship of an advanced nuclear-powered attack submarine took place in Severodvinsk." Experts are skeptical about its "advanced nature," maintaining that it is only another Sierra-class nuclear-powered submarine, of which more than enough have already been built.

Construction of advanced nuclear-powered submarines having no prospects is a classic example of actions by the military industrial lobby. In the absence of competition, this lobby is virtually all-powerful—any criticism is quickly neutralized. You see, it involves money—and big money, and awards for creating an allegedly silent new



submarine. The Sevmashpredpriyatiye Production Association received priority financing—such a nuclear-powered submarine will cost taxpayers the sum of about 1 trillion rubles.

That same memorandum talks about an attempt by an "opposition" group of scientists to make a number of changes in the strategy of building nuclear-powered submarines.

"These proposals were supported by submariners of the Northern and Pacific fleets, scientists, and designers and confirmed by interdepartmental tests and tactical exercises between 1982 and 1986. The experience amassed was analyzed by the departments concerned and in 1985 approved by the Navy VTS and recommended for introduction into operation. At the same time, it should be noted that the commander in chief of the Navy, V.N. Chernavin, reacting negatively to these proposals for reasons known only to him, by Directive No. 0026 of 28 March 1987 delayed commissioning... At the same time, the proposals were actively supported by Fleet Admiral I.N. Smirnov, who from 1982 to 1986 personally supervised all work and testing."

The commander in chief of the Navy at that time, Admiral Chernavin, cut off all the oxygen to new proposals, probably because otherwise he would have had to explain the stubborn ignoring of the facts since 1974! And the more of these facts there were, the higher the classification stamp on the documents.

"Competent experts note that all the conclusions of the Navy, industry, and science, made in response to appeals to the levels of authority by Academician Aleksandrov, Fleet Admiral Yegorov (former chief of the Main Staff of the Navy—Author), and Captain 1st Rank Kolton during the period 1988-1990, as a rule, are flagrantly distorted, and the favorable results of research and studies made during the period 1982-1986 are often falsified and basically aimed at confirming the earlier unsound decision made by Navy Commander in Chief Chernavin, outlined in Directive No. 0026-87."

For some reason, we began to get the opinion that the military-industrial complex was almost the national pride of Russia. Meanwhile, the military-industrial complex was infected by the same mutation as the entire economy. It is dangerous to build illusions—the quality of our nuclear-powered submarines is no better than the quality of our automobiles.

"The state of affairs with the noise level of domestic nuclear-powered submarines is made worse by the lack of an effective enemy submarine detection system. In the field of sonar equipment, the U.S. Navy surpasses the USSR Navy considerably, which has resulted in enemy nuclear-powered submarines having the capability of delivering a strike against Soviet submarines and remaining undetected as a result of the low specifications and performance characteristics of our sonar complexes.

"The U.S. Navy's submarines detect Soviet submarines at distances exceeding the operating range of domestic sonar systems by 120-140 km. The sonar systems of surface ships

of the U.S. Navy are also significantly superior in operating range to similar Soviet models. The enemy is 7-12 years ahead of us in sonar systems used by naval aviation and 20 years ahead in implementing individual technical designs."

An analysis of collisions between Russian and foreign submarines **WITHIN THE RUSSIAN MARITIME ZONE** indicates that this memorandum is close to objectivity. Our submarines make so much noise that they do not even hear the "tail" behind them.

In the Barents Sea on 11 February 1992, at the moment of surfacing for a scheduled communications session, a Russian Sierra-class submarine collided with a massive body, which turned out to be the USS Baton Rouge nuclear-powered submarine of the U.S. Navy. Our commander, like he was supposed to according to known corresponding instructions, evaded from the unknown target to a safe depth.

There have been a total of 11 collisions. As a rule, they occurred several minutes after a sudden change in heading or submerged depth by the "deaf" Soviet nuclear-powered submarine. For some time now, Russian submariners have been directed not to make sudden turns to avoid possible collisions with nuclear-powered submarines.

"The seriousness of the matter lies not only in the fact that the Ministry of the Shipbuilding Industry is removing the urgency of the problem of struggling for acoustics superiority of our submarines. It is disorienting the levels of authority, reporting the approximate equality of the noise level of our third- and fourth-generation nuclear-powered submarines being built and being designed with U.S. Navy nuclear-powered submarines, and thereby is misleading them about the actual combat capabilities of our maritime strategic nuclear system."

The Americans, apparently, already have the noise profiles of all our nuclear-powered submarines, and observations in the combat training zones have enabled them to record noises corresponding to bringing Soviet nuclear-powered submarines to a missile-launch readiness.

Of course, no one plans to fight the Americans. However, what sense does it make to "forge" nuclear-powered submarines no one needs and on which citizens of Russia will perform duty no one needs?

#### **Chernavin Accused on Lack of Readiness of Submarine Fleet**

94UM0408C Moscow *STOLITSA* in Russian No 12 (174), 1994 pp 16-17

[Interview with Captain 1st Rank Albert Ivanovich Khaptovich, former commander of a nuclear-powered missile-carrying submarine, by Vladimir Voronov: "The Admiral's 'Paper' Truth"]

[Text] In the article "Paper Nautilus" (*STOLITSA*, No 45, 1993), Captain 1st Rank Ilya Kolton asserted: The Russian strategic submarine fleet is not combat effective—

the potential adversary tracks literally every one of our ships. The whole point is that our domestic submarines make too much noise.

Fleet Admiral Vladimir Chernavin, former commander in chief of the USSR Navy, did not agree with this, which he reported in PRAVDA ("Paper Nautilus in the Sea of Life," 9 February 1994), calling our article a "monstrous lie." The arguments of STOLITSA were not to the admiral's liking also because the author of the magazine article was "an engineer-mechanic—nothing more, but who had assumed the role of a strategist-analyst."

Well, today we give the floor to a person whom even former Commander in Chief Chernavin would not dare to accuse of lacking professionalism or being ignorant of strategic problems. Albert Khrapovich is a captain 1st rank of the reserve, commanded a nuclear-powered missile-carrying submarine for 11 years, and is the holder of many state awards.

#### Who Needed "Atrina"?

[Voronov] Albert Ivanovich, Fleet Admiral Chernavin tells about the super-secret fleet operation of 1987 under the code name "Atrina". At that time a group of nuclear-powered submarines seemed to have successfully broken away from NATO antisubmarine forces. Does it turn out that the assertions of Captain 1st Rank Kolton were far from reality?

[Khrapovich] Let us first try to understand, why did Admiral Chernavin conduct Operation Atrina in general?

*"We had to teach a little lesson to the potential adversary, who had gotten a swelled head, and show that, when necessary, we can become illusive 'avengers', that is, operate in a sufficiently concealed manner to deliver a retaliatory strike..."*

So, from the very beginning everything was conceived for show? The submarine fleet should be "illusive" without such operations. But here it was—"when necessary!"

The retired admiral even said that such a large-scale and devastating action was needed, in general, only by him—his personal "international prestige" depended on its success. Someone naive could even believe that combat effectiveness concerns Chernavin!

So, it is only a desire to establish oneself! Instead of normal work—to organize a rush job and report.

[Voronov] But according to Chernavin, they were successful.

[Khrapovich] The victory was only in the reports; in practice, everything was different. It is even apparent from the ex-commander in chief's article that the NATO forces had the capability to detect virtually all our submarines easily. An "illuminated" submarine can be considered destroyed. Do I have to explain how effective a Navy is whose submarine forces are being constantly monitored by a potential adversary? But instead of trying to correct the situation, the admiral conducts a special operation; he says, on such ships we sometimes get away from you. Well,

that is simply nonsense! And all this in order to "teach" the opponent one time. What is the cost to the budget for such a dashing move?

The admiral also does not try to hide the fact that neither he himself nor the Navy were even minimally prepared for Operation Atrina. Preparation took a lot of time—ships had to be brought to the proper degree of technical readiness. For the first time in the Navy's history, in the admiral's words, joint training of commanders of submarines and aircraft was conducted—an entire division of naval aviation was used in the operation. There also was no experience of a simultaneous long-range cruise by five nuclear-powered submarines immediately. How did he plan to fight?

After all, if there indeed was a serious desire to fundamentally change the strategy and approach the problem of undetectability of the submarine fleet in a new way, why whip everyone into a fever, why such massiveness and haste?

The Americans noted the departure of the division of submarines, but paid no special attention to it. They are going, they said, and we know where and why. Yes, in the event of combat operations, they would have eliminated our ships back when they were departing base!

#### Maritime "Cat-and-Mouse"

It seemed that we had broken away. Success! Victory! In the words of Chernavin, three squadrons of antisubmarine warfare [ASW] aircraft, six nuclear-powered submarines, and three hunter-killer groups from the U.S. and British navies were thrown into the search for the detachment that had disappeared... What power! But any professional will tell you that actually these are more than modest forces for searching for five nuclear-powered submarines at sea. So what? Without exerting any special effort, the Americans soon detected the detachment of our ships. Perhaps Admiral Chernavin himself is not fully aware how badly he let the cat out of the bag? After all, no one forced him to say this: "They tracked Captain 1st Rank Shevchenko's detachment almost the entire return route and did not stop working until the Norwegian Sea..."

You see, this is a total catastrophe, a failure! It can be considered that five crews and five ships were already listed among the casualties. The detected submarine was a dead submarine. In essence, the mission facing the detachment was thwarted. Even if only one submarine is "illuminated," the causes of the failure and the specific parties responsible are carefully investigated and analyzed in any Navy in such a case. Here the Americans did not simply detect the whole detachment, they practiced methods of tracking and attack as much as they wanted. And this most serious defeat of ours is passed off almost as an outstanding achievement!

#### Towards the Fondest "Star"

Then something happens that is unprecedented in any normal navy, but traditional in ours: An extravagant report to the "very top," a downpour of orders, medals,

ranks, expensive gifts... Incredible? The submariners themselves who carried out Chernavin's order, of course, are not at all to blame. With the equipment they had, the armament and acoustics available, and with the noise level which Captain 1st Rank Kolton justly wrote about, detection of the submarines by a potential adversary was simply a foregone conclusion. Admiral Chernavin knows this perfectly well, too. Incidentally, he considers one of the main achievements of the cruise to be the fact that everyone returned to base "without any human losses or serious damage." We submariners know how much "minor" damage there was and what its cost was. So, the seamen received their awards deservedly, and their leaders...

I think Chernavin himself would very much like to add the fond words "of the Soviet Union" to the rank "fleet admiral."

#### Confidentially—to the Whole World

If Operation Atrina actually would have been a serious operation to practice or test new methods of deploying submarines in areas of possible combat operations, it would have still remained in strictest secrecy to this day! The admiral would not have dared to even mention it in PRAVDA or any other paper. This was a cheap game on the public. Just one fact: In order to "break away" from the NATO ships that were "stuck" to them, Chernavin authorized the submarine commanders to use even sonar countermeasures equipment. But, you see, this is categorically forbidden, since it gives away to the potential adversary their specifications and performance characteristics and combat capabilities. This can only be done in actual combat. Chernavin, it turns out, declassified that which should remain classified right up until the first round is fired! And even this did not help...

All such activities of comrade Chernavin are from the known series of measures for show, like building the largest missile-carrying submarine in the world. Enormous amounts of money have been spent and for nothing—it is virtually impossible to hide such a submarine; it will easily be destroyed. Or take the epic for constructing a nuclear-powered aircraft-carrying cruiser. The whole country, overexerting itself, is building it. Later it turns out that it will be unable to defend itself, not mention inflicting battle damage on the enemy! There were no docking platforms or power support for the gigantic monstrosities. They rusted and rotted, and a considerable amount of money is also needed to utilize them. There was no money left for housing for the officer and warrant officer families.

The words of the former Navy leader are blasphemy to a real seaman: "We also restored our reputation in the eyes of the potential adversary". (It turns out, the commander in chief was interested not in combat effectiveness but in "reputation"). "When all is said and done, we only achieved equality with you, NATO admirals, in the number of lost nuclear-powered submarines," the admiral joyously informs us. How can he flaunt this?! After all, Chernavin is still "cunning"—by that time we had already "overtaken" our opponents in losses, using the admiral's terminology.

[Voronov] Is Chernavin personally to blame for such a deplorable state of the submarine fleet?

[Khaptovich] According to his colleagues, he was a pretty good ship and task force commander. But as soon as he became commander of the Northern Fleet, it was as if someone had taken his place. Therefore, I would not begin to assert that the entire problem is in the system—it, they say, pulverized and subordinated anything to itself. Much also depends on the person. For example, such admirals as G. Yegorov, N. Amelko, R. Golosov, and E. Baltin did not forgo their conscience, trying to do all that was dependent upon them, even during those years.

I had occasion to run into Admiral Chernavin face to face, including in the office of the USSR minister of defense. This was in 1988, when a series of serious accidents had forced Gorbachev to question the status of the Navy. But the commander in chief, more concerned about his personal situation completely denied that there were any shortcomings in his department and convinced Marshal Yazov that everything was in order in the Navy.

But you see, the ones who criticize Chernavin himself and talk about the condition of the Navy are the professional submariners. And they only want to create a special commission made up of independent experts to finally tell the truth about our naval forces. Do we need security or the illusion of it? Only uninformed citizens of our own country can be deceived by myths. The potential "adversary," like our own seamen, know everything.

Okay, we will wait until the next Tsushima incident...

From the editor. To be honest, we did not at all plan to open up a naval debate on the pages of our magazine. But the point is that it is impossible for people independent of the military-industrial lobby to express themselves on the pages of "their" military journals and newspapers. Moreover, as it seems to us, this is not so much a military problem as it is a problem of security of the society and the state.

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## REAR SERVICES, SUPPORT ISSUES

### Col-Gen Churanov Discusses Problems of Rear Services

94UM0395A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
13 Apr 94 p 2

[Interview with Colonel General Vladimir Churanov, chief of the rear services of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, by Petr Altunin on behalf of the readers of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA: "Problems Arise Every Day"]

[Text] The rear services play a paramount role in ensuring the vital activities of the troops and forces of the navy. This is understandable, for a soldier must be provided with shoes and clothing and given a full meal three times a day and tanks and aircraft will not move without fuel.... And it is not surprising that the lion's share of letters to the editor's office involve questions of rear services and the everyday needs of



*service personnel. After grouping the most important of them, we asked Col. Gen. Vladimir Churanov to respond to them.*

[Altunin] Vladimir Timofeyevich, about a year ago the newspapers were writing about some changes in the rear services of the armed forces. What has been done?

[Churanov] Reforms are under way in accordance with the plan and stages of the development of the armed forces. But I want to emphasize that reforms in the rear are not a goal in themselves and especially are not aimed at demolishing the things of value that have been created—I am not afraid to say it—from the days to Peter to our own time.

In the course of the year experiment in converting to a territorial system in support of the troops that is being carried out in the Moscow Military District, we were once again convinced of its prospects. Consideration of the special features of the stationing of troops and the economic possibilities of the region make it possible to optimize administrative-economic, transportation, information, and other ties. And accordingly, under the conditions of the decentralization of the supply process on the scale of the country, we will be able, in the first place, not "to lose" stability and autonomy in the support of the troops and, secondly, to organize and strengthen interaction with local authorities and, the main thing, with suppliers. In any case, we will be able to buy perishable food products and seasonable produce at relatively low prices, which is especially important at this time.

As in any innovation, there are difficulties here. I would say that there is still much that needs to be smoothed out and made more logical. For this reason, we are expanding the base of the experiment and planning to carry it out in other regions of Russia this year.

Recently, as a member of a commission under the leadership of the minister of defense, I had the occasion to work in Kaliningrad Special Defense Area. Under the conditions of its remoteness, precisely the territorial principle was made the basis of the material support of the troops and forces of the navy.

Still another problem that one must pay attention to is the financing of the needs of the rear. In 1993, only 56 percent of these needs were met. Of course in the end they got by but at what a price! The reduction of the consumption of fuel and the extension of the time for the wearing of items of clothing went, as they say, to the extreme limits allowed. The only thing that they did not cut back was the food for the soldiers. One cannot save on this.

In closely analyzing the existing system for the financing of the needs of the rear from the center to the military unit, we come to the conclusion that it must be changed. After all, we have such rigid expenditure items—food, clothing, material supplies, and fuel—essentially not subject to adjustment that the money for these needs ought not to be in some common pot somewhere but rather must come to us in special allocations. We do not yet have this.

[Altunin] Our mail includes many letters from aviators. Planned flights were continually being disrupted because of a shortage of kerosene and various lubricating oils. What will happen this year?

[Churanov] I have already touched on this question. It may be that they feel the shortage of fuel more acutely in aviation than elsewhere but unfortunately the picture is similar in other branches of the armed forces as well—in the navy, for example. Again, we are seeing the effects of our direct dependence upon the situation in the country's fuel and energy system. Judging by everything, this situation will not change this year either.

What should be done here? There is just one answer, save wherever we can. We are also seeking other ways. We will soon begin to produce some kinds of oils and lubricants independently using our own capacities. A scientific research institute of the Ministry of Defense and industry are carrying out work to select critical oils.

[Altunin] "In the enlisted mess, they often serve canned products instead of fresh meat and there is a shortage of other items. What is the explanation for this?" write our readers, soldiers in compulsory service in the Siberian Military District.

[Churanov] That is a very important question and I would say that it is fundamental for us. After all, the food for the personnel largely determines not only the physical but also the psychological state of the soldiers. The main task here remains the same: The soldier's table must have a full complement of products corresponding to the established norms.

What is the reason for this situation? Unfortunately, it lies in the country's reduced food potential. Last year the cost of the daily ration for the military as a whole increased from 140 to 1,200 rubles [R] and, as I have already said, the financing is limited. In the first three months of the year, we received less than half of the money needed for the purchase of food. We are borrowing with incredible assurances. We must recognize that our past reserves are still helping us out. We eat them and then we replenish them.

The high duties recently introduced on the importation of foodstuffs have practically not affected us so far (imports are insignificant for us) but if they go into effect and extend to the countries of the near abroad, then we will doubtless feel their pressure, especially in the procurement period.

The overwhelming majority of specialists in the food service are persistently assimilating market mechanisms and are striving to buy products more cheaply and to expand and diversify the assortment of dishes being prepared. Much is being done in this direction in the garrisons of Moscow, Siberian, Leningrad, and other military districts, where the preparation of two second dishes has already become the norm at enlisted mess halls.

But it is not so everywhere. Checks are revealing cases of pilferage of products from warehouses and instances where the norm does not reach the individual soldier as it should. Decisive measures are being taken in such cases, even to the point of prosecuting those who are guilty.

[Altunin] And this is from a letter by reserve officers who formerly worked in the rear services: "We see on television that agricultural equipment has broken down at many farms and is not prepared for the sowing season. What is happening at our military sovkhozes?"

[Churanov] There can be only one answer to this question: Under difficult economic conditions, military sovkhozes and the subsidiary plots of military units act to some extent as the guarantor of stable production of agricultural output for the needs of the army and navy.

Overall, things are getting better for them. As of 1 March, 70 percent of the tractors had been repaired for the spring sowing, most other farm equipment had been made ready for the sowing campaign, and the necessary quantity of seed material had been procured....

[Altunin] "New uniform. We in our unit see it primarily on television and in the newspapers. When will it be issued to us?" asks Warrant Officer [praporshchik] S. Gusev (Ural Military District).

[Churanov] In accordance with the previously affirmed plan, the full conversion of the service personnel of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation to the new uniform is taking place in stages and is supposed to be concluded by the end of 1995. But those same disruptions in the financing of the rear services may also put into doubt the reality of this deadline. Thus, only a little more than half of the money needed for procurement of the new military clothing was allocated in 1993.

Enterprises of light industry that have traditionally worked for us are in a critical situation. Because of our nonpayment, their inventories are piling up, they stand idle, they are failing to pay wages to workers, and some of them are closing.

Of course, the clothing service is not idle and all possible measures are being taken to correct the situation. In our reciprocal accounts, we are forced to select the most necessary items: striped undershirts, camouflage, new model shoes, and the like, without which the service simply cannot function today, and to "borrow" sheets and pillowcases, for example, from our warehouses. First of all, as provided for by order of the minister of defense, we are now supplying service personnel in the Moscow and St. Petersburg garrisons, graduates of military schools and academies, soldiers at garrisons where staffs of military districts and fleets are located, and other military units taking into account the peculiarities and specific nature of their military service.

[Altunin] "It was reported in the newspapers that in military trade, as a check revealed, there are many serious shortcomings of various kinds. What specifically is happening there? What measures are being taken?" This is the question of Captain S. Bogachev from St. Petersburg.

[Churanov] Yes, recently there have indeed been less than flattering articles in the press about the work of military trade but from them one cannot draw the conclusion that there is nothing but crime there. After all, military trade is not just stores and warehouses. Its system includes more

than 18,000 enterprises of various kinds located throughout the territory of Russia and beyond its borders and, finally, about 100,000 employees, the overwhelming majority of whom are working conscientiously despite the difficulties that are worsening every day—a shortage of working capital and rising prices.

And as a result, the commodity turnover last year amounted to more than R600 billion, seven times what it was the previous year. Military trade contributed about R25 billion to the state budget.

Overall, the agencies of military trade and its system are continuing to improve. The organizational staff structure is changing, parallel links and superfluous administrative agencies are being eliminated, wholesale-retail associations are being established, and domestic trade enterprises are being included in the territorial system of rear services.

A new normative-legal base is being developed, with the adoption of which, in particular the "Statute on Military Trade," it will be possible to eliminate contradictions with existing legislation and to fulfill the corresponding statutes of the Law of the Russian Federation "On the Status of Service Personnel."

I do not deny that the leadership of the rear services as well as local people have a lot of grievances against the work of military trade. And it is no secret that there are also people there with dirty hands and there is cheating and miscounting. Complaints about this are not ignored.

The miscalculations made in 1991-92 continue to be eliminated, especially in external trade. Contracts made with insolvent firms by former managers of military trade at different levels are being canceled and the invested money is being returned to the account of the Main Trade Directorate of the Ministry of Defense. Criminal suits have been brought against liable persons who permitted unjustifiable trade deals.

### **Balancing Defense, Transport Requirements Under New Doctrine**

94UM0395B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA  
in Russian 15 Apr 94 p 2

[Article by Major General Vyacheslav Omelchenko, current member of the Academy for Transport and chief of the Military Transport Institute, under "Interests of Russia" rubric: "A Knot of Transport Problems: Will the State Program Untie It?"]

[Text] On 8 February, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA published the article by Col. Yu. Kirsanov, "New Routes, Old Problems," that touched on the problem of the combining of defense and transport strategies. It evoked a vigorous response from specialists. Today we continue the conversation.

Now that our economy is being reformed and the armed forces are being structurally reorganized and cut back, it is very important not to permit a lowering of the country's defensive potential. How can this be accomplished? Back in the middle of the last century, military minister I.

Mordvinov expressed the idea that if necessary the army can be reduced without harm if in so doing transport is used for the rapid movement of troops to the "threatened borders" of the Russian state.

In our time as well, transport communications fulfill not only economic functions but also military-strategic functions. It is for this reason, in my view, that the program "Transport Russia" now being developed is so important. The developers performed an in-depth analysis of the actual state of the country's transportation network. Here, for example, is what railroad transportation looks like, which accounts for 52 percent of conveyances. The overall length of our railroads is less than one-fourth that of those in the United States and the density of the network is one-seventh of what they have. But the freight traffic is almost 10 times that of the United States.

The traffic on the West Siberian, South Urals, East Siberian, and Transbaikal railroads is especially intense. In the European part, major changes in the directions of freight flows may arise in the direction center-south. Of the four main lines that serve it, three cross the territory of Ukraine in their southern part. For this reason, the concentration of freight flows may shift in the direction of Moscow-Michurinsk-Liski-Rostov. This will require much work to increase the throughput and carrying capacity of this line or to establish a new main line with a terminal in Mineralnyye Vody. In the direction Kuznetsk Basin-Urals, freight is moved along the Main, Middle, and Southern Siberian routes. The last two mostly cross the territory of Kazakhstan. There there can be a shift in freight flows toward the Main Siberian Route. And this will also require additional strengthening.

The high intensity of traffic leads to early deterioration of the railroads. In 1992, speed was limited on 12,000 km of railroads. This is equivalent to a railroad like the Moscow Railroad working at half capacity. The situation may worsen. More than 18 percent of the cross ties and a significant part of the rails have finished their service life. Their share is especially high on the main lines that were built long ago. For example, 21 percent of the accidents and malfunctions registered on all railroads can be attributed to the October Railroad, the first railroad in Russia, which accounts for 12 percent of the total length of the country's steel lines.

One must also consider the factor that Russian railroads have tens of thousands of bridges, tunnels, and other artificial structures with a total length of 2,262.6 km. About 10 percent of them have defects but are in use. There is traffic across bridges built under the standards of 1884-1896, which have been in service for a time that is twice the norm. A further strengthening of the spans of such bridges is no longer possible. They must be replaced with new bridges. But this is an extraordinarily complex and costly measure, especially when it is a matter of bridges across such rivers as the Volga, Don, Oka, Kama, Ob, Yenisey, Zeya, and Amur. Last year the number of prolonged restrictions of speed doubled because of the unsatisfactory state of artificial structures.

And there are many such slow-acting "mines" on the railroads. They include, for example, the defective road beds in the eastern areas of Russia in connection with a warming of the climate. On the Transbaikal Railroad alone, 75 percent of the earthen base of the road was laid on permafrost. As a result of the constantly increasing number of deformations, expenditures for the repair of the railroad have now increased by a factor of almost seven. If measures are not taken, the Transbaikal Railroad may become impassable. Overall for all kinds of transport, the depletion of production capital amounts to 38 percent.

This is by no means a complete listing of the problems with our transport. But it indicates rather clearly that under these conditions it is very difficult for transport to satisfy the needs of the armed forces with respect to military conveyances. There is a widespread opinion that in the existing situation the mobility of units and combined units may be increased by taking the course of the priority development of military transport aviation. But one should not exaggerate the possibilities of this aviation, for above all it must provide for the landing of assault forces, accomplish the most urgent troop maneuvers, deliver weapons and other freight, and evacuate the wounded.

The share of railroad transport in military conveyances remains high. Under today's conditions as well, it is seen as one of the most important forms of transportation that is most suitable and convenient for large-scale movements of troops and cargo, especially when it is a matter of heavy and bulky weapons and equipment. There are also other advantages inherent only in rail transport: For example, the rapid rehabilitation of the roads, the low degree of dependence on weather conditions, and the preservation of the relative integrity and accordingly combat capability of units and subunits during the time of their transport by rail. All of this puts rail transport into first place in military transport movements. Naturally this does not diminish the role of other kinds of transport in the realization of the requirements of military doctrine. All of these problems are now the focus of attention of the scientists of the Military Transport Institute, who in their research work closely with other higher institutes of transport learning in the country.

In this respect, what prospects flow from the program "Transport Russia"? It is intended to overcome crisis phenomena and to guarantee steady work for the railroads in 1994-1997 and to achieve a world level of transport by 2005. Overall, the program shows the prospects for the formation of a transport network and the coordinated development of every kind of transport and the management of the transportation system. The subprograms "Transport Space" and "Transport Technology" constructed under the branch principle also make it possible to forecast the military strategic possibilities of new and rebuilt main lines and from this position to put demands on the established transport network and produced industrial goods. Unfortunately, however, overall defensive functions are not purposefully incorporated into the program.



It is forecast that by 1997 the volume of freight moved in the railroad network will decrease by 25 percent and no increase in its density is foreseen before about 2000. On the contrary, it is planned to write off up to 20,000 km of lines that have completed their service life. It appears that under these conditions the question of the elimination of unprofitable sections, leading to a reduction of the length of railroads, must be coordinated with the country's military leadership. A similar precedent arose in the United States at the beginning of the 1980's. When there were plans there for the closing and dismantling of several railroad lines, the leadership of the armed forces came out against this and took control of the network of the militarily most important railroads, proving their strategic necessity.

There is still another problem. It is proposed beginning in 2000 to carry out preparatory work in the building of high-speed railroad lines. In world practice, this concept is realized through the reconstruction of existing lines (this is basically the course taken by the United States and other countries with a dense network of railroads) or through new construction. My opinion is that for defensive purposes it is expedient for us to take the second course.

And now about the economic-mathematic model for the functioning of our transport. It was worked out with an orientation toward the transportation system of the United States and forces a redistribution of investments in favor of an increase in conveyances by motor vehicles, which does not take into account our special circumstances in Russia. The model also does not consider expenditures for the realization of defense demands on transport.

The primary reason for the indicated shortcomings is the fact that the developers of the program "Transport Russia," having taken the initiative in such an important matter, did not involve specialists in military transport services in this joint work, above all the service for military transport communications that ensures the representation of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation in rail, sea, river, and air transport and that is empowered to raise military-technical demands on the development of these kinds of transportation. In our opinion, the existing draft of the program requires detailed study by military specialists together with interested transport agencies. Only after this can it be presented to the government for consideration.

In the development of the defense aspect of the program, one certainly cannot discard such a purely Russian peculiarity of ours in which troops actively participate in the resolution of national economic tasks. Every year motor vehicle units carry out large volumes of agricultural conveyances and road building units work intensively to build roads in the Nonchernozem lands. The railroad troops are performing an especially large volume of work. Despite being at less than full strength and despite interruptions in financing and supply, they are continuing to build and reconstruct railroad lines of different purposes. In so doing, naturally, the troops are primarily being involved in the building of transport facilities of paramount significance for defense. The troops also play a major role in the elimination of the consequences of accidents and disasters.

That is, the entire military transport structure is being fully loaded with work and in peacetime, accordingly, it is a great omission to fail to consider the role of the military in the country's transportation strategy.

It may be that it even makes sense to include an independent subprogram in the comprehensive program "Transport Russia." We will conditionally call it "Military Transport" and it would reflect defense requirements and ways to carry them out.

### Activities of Fund for Social Protection of Servicemen

944D0032A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
29 Apr 94 p 4

[Interview with Fund for the Social Protection of Servicemen President Reserve Major Erast Aleksandrovich Galumov by an unidentified KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent: "Our Principle—An Equal Partnership: Fund for the Social Protection of Servicemen"]

[Text] There are currently many funds for the social protection of servicemen. Yes and not all of them are of any real benefit; many have given way to commerce...

But concern about military people essentially forms the basis of the development and consolidation as a market structure of the fund that is located in the capital's Smolenskaya-Sennaya Ploshchad [Square]. But then again, the Fund for the Social Protection of Servicemen President Reserve Major Erast Aleksandrovich Galumov will discuss this in more detail.

Erast Aleksandrovich Galumov is a reserve major who was born in 1958. He is a Tbilisi native. He graduated from Tbilisi Higher Artillery Command School in 1979. He served in TransBaykal and was released into the reserve due to reductions in 1990. He is a businessman.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Erast Aleksandrovich, the ritual question is: Is the fund—also a technique for earning money?

[Galumov] That is not the main thing. You can earn—more and more rapidly—by not founding a fund for social protection. Moreover, the fund's founders do not have that urgent need—all of them are successful businessmen.

Something else is essential. An enormous group of highly qualified, disciplined, experienced people are leaving the army's ranks. Some do not know where to go in the civilian sector, others want to start their own businesses but do not have start-up capital, and still others need organizational and legal assistance... They can find all of that at our fund.

Recently, several junior officers, who will be released into the reserve in the near future, visited my office. They have a productive idea that permits them to develop a quite

profitable business but they have neither the money nor the experience of "going into business". We are subsidizing them and we are carrying out, speaking military language, organizational and legal support at no charge, without requiring any dividends whatsoever...

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Altruism? Is there a place for that in our market?

[Galumov] The issue is not altruism. We know that an enterprise that the fund can help to stand on its feet will certainly begin to cooperate with it. This is not our first day in the market and we have at our disposal commercial experience, a data bank, ties in the world of finance (we are co-founders of the Moscow City Bank), and a network of partners throughout the country... And therefore, as partners, very promising.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] What are the primary directions of the fund's activities?

[Galumov] They are varied. There is a broad spectrum of legal services. We are engaged in job placement. During the past year, we helped people find work—in accordance with the skills and requests of the very people who have been released into the reserve—approximately 2,000 people. And the data base continues to be augmented by enterprises' requests for reserve officers whose cadre value is already universally recognized in our labor market.

Investments occupy a large place in our plans. The preference is for regional investment programs. For example, right now we are developing an investment program at a defense plant jointly with the Russian Academy of Sciences. Incidentally, the regional direction of our investment programs helps us to create locally, figuratively speaking, "cadre subunits" that can immediately be deployed and ensure rapid realization of larger programs in the regions if necessary.

We are aggressively participating in purely scientific projects. And major scientific institutions willingly cooperate with us. Because we are uniting people who have gone through the army school—those who, due to their professionalism, discipline and ability to work under the most complex conditions, are worth so much right now.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] But what socially oriented programs have you already managed to carry out and what's in the plans?

[Galumov] In our view, philanthropy must have a precise address. For example, we assumed responsibility for distinctive pension support for some veterans of war and disabled people who have lost the ability to work. We pay 50,000-500,000 rubles per month in addition to the state pension of each one depending on the specific situation. For the time being, we are allocating R5 million per month for this purpose. We recently conducted a discharge sale at military hospitals at reduced prices. (We sold goods at prices that were much lower than the purchase prices)...

What's in the plans? Let's put it this way: Let our philanthropic acts become pleasant surprises for everyone.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Erast Aleksandrovich, just how active in the sphere of entrepreneurship are those reserve officers whom you have helped?

[Galumov] They are active and this equally applies to Great Patriotic War veterans' social organizations and to junior "reservists". For example, branches of the fund in Vladivostok, Khabarovsk, Chita, Bratsk, and Novosibirsk, that are led by recent cadre officers, are operating with a high return and more than 20 major commercial programs are in the stage of realization today.

And, in general, I must tell you that our fund acts, and let's hope, will act henceforth as a center of gravity for former servicemen. We are our own people: Until recently we ate from the same pot, we lived according to the same regulations and according to the same code. We are loyal to it even today, officer's honor. So we understand and trust each other. And perhaps there is no other path—we need to jointly, shoulder to shoulder, resolve all problems. Moreover, how many former military personnel (currently entrepreneurs, frankly speaking), are flailing around in our market, not knowing where to find a place for themselves and becoming easy targets for any criminal. We need to unite; we will be stronger and more confident. This will be required; for the purpose of this unification, the fund is prepared to offer in principle an equal partnership for everything at its disposal: information support, the accumulated experience of entrepreneurship, ties, and resources...

**The address of the Fund for the Social Protection of Servicemen is: Building 6, No 30, Smolenskaya-Sennaya Ploshchad, Moscow. Contact telephone—241-21-71.**

#### **Supplying Troops From Military Farms**

944D0025A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
4 May 94 p 1

[Article by Petr Altunin: "While the Future of the Countryside is Being Debated, 100 Military Sovkhozes are Planting Grain"]

[Text] Passions are boiling on parliamentary podiums and in the press: What road is our agriculture to travel? The one thing that's clear now is that the reforms carried out in this area have not produced results. In comparison with 1992, in 1993 the area devoted to cereal crops "slimmed" by 4 percent, that devoted to potatoes decreased by 17 percent, and that for vegetables decreased by 21 percent. Experts predict that this year there will be not more than 85-90 million tons in the granaries, which is significantly less than in recent years. The numbers of farm animals and birds declined dramatically due to the shortage of feed.

How in this situation is food being supplied to the armed forces? To put it briefly, the servicemen are receiving their full allotment. The fact that the structure of the food assortment often changes, with some products being replaced by others, is another matter.

"Commanders and rear services have to display maximum shrewdness to buy cheaper in one place and to ask for credit yet another time in some other place, thus balancing

the food situation," said Lieutenant-General Vyacheslav Savinov, chief of the Central Food Directorate of the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense. "It is becoming increasingly more evident today that the military budget is not going to grow any in the immediate future. This means we have to count on our own strengths to a considerable degree. What strengths are these? You can't send soldiers out into the fields—there aren't enough of them for the combat subunits. Our hopes lie with the military sovkhozes. They must become one of the guaranteed sources of food support to the army and navy."

What is their position today? The army's is favorable on the whole. Today, its pennants fly over as many as 100 sovkhozes—more than the 67 that survived the USSR's disintegration, and there are another dozen waiting in the wings. What is attracting them to the army? Order. Given the imperfect legislation and the continuing verbal battles "at the top" on the fate of the kolkhoz peasantry, villages and towns suffering the effects of privatization are floating downstream with no idea of how to get to shore.

In the meantime, rural laborers believe that the army could help with equipment and fuel, set up social, cultural and personal services, and take food products in trade. This is the way new sovkhozes came to the Moscow Military District and to the missile and aerospace forces. And the Northern Fleet, which possesses four livestock sovkhozes that had recently been feeling an acute shortage of feed, stretched its arm all the way out to Volgograd Oblast and took in eight steppe sovkhozes and one in Kursk Oblast (that one, by the way, even has its own name—Krasnaya Zvezda) under its flag of St. Andrew.

The defense ministry also concerned itself with the legal basis. By a government decision, military sovkhozes were proclaimed to be federal property, and not subject to privatization. This year in addition to other farms of the country, they are being granted preferential loans.

There is of course a limiting factor affecting the desire to take as many farms as possible under the wing of the armed forces—money. During recent zonal conferences of directors of army agricultural enterprises organized by the armed forces rear services, the idea circulated that rather than focusing on the quantity of sovkhozes, we need to transform the presently existing farms into highly profitable ones.

What needs to be done for this today? The most practical problems, which have generally been around forever, have be to solved. Ones like scientifically substantiated crop rotation, sensible fertilization of the soil, rational selection of plants and animals, protection of the harvest from pests, and so on. For this, we need to awaken the sense of ownership in each person, teach him to keep track of every

ruble spent and of the return enjoyed from it, and provide good wages. It is precisely because of this approach to the work that good results are being enjoyed at the Yubileyny, Novaya Lyada and Podlesnyy farms (Moscow Military District) where, for example, last year's potato harvest was 108, 140 and 107 centners per hectare. And Military Sovkhoz No 14 is regularly producing 4.71 kg of milk from every forage-fed cow.

Auxiliary farms contribute strong support to the "foundation" of military sovkhozes. Last year they produced 8,000 tonnes of meat, 8,500 tonnes of milk, 9.6 million eggs, and over 22,000 tons of potatoes and vegetables. There are even units able to provide meat and other food products for themselves half a year or more into the future—for example those commanded by Lieutenant Colonels Aleksandr Makarov and Aleksandr Babarykin and Lieutenant Colonel Leonid Vaskin.

Recently, of course, an alarming trend has appeared: Some auxiliary farms have started surrendering. There are objective reasons for this: The army is undergoing reorganization, personnel strength is decreasing, and then there's that same old problem—feed. The military sovkhozes could provide considerable assistance to their "lesser brothers." This is already being done in many of the districts.

And of course, you can't get anything done without order and executive discipline. Another obstacle today is the "outside criminal"—racketeers are making their way into the military sovkhozes: Brandishing weapons, in Saratov Oblast they meet loaded vehicles demanding tribute, and Chechens are raiding pastures of Prokhladnyy Sovkhoz (Kabardino-Balkaria), where they hogtie the herdsmen and rustle the livestock. One would think that the army could come to the aid of its breadwinners.

One hundred military sovkhozes, plus 34 special dairies, and 3,456 auxiliary farms. They work 370,000 hectares of farmland, and maintain 98,000 head of cattle, 200,000 pigs, 137,000 sheep and 864,000 birds.

Is this a little, or a lot? The food products that have been produced are enough to supply the armed forces for 2.1 months with meat, 4 months with eggs, 2 months with potatoes and vegetables, and an entire year with milk. If these indicators are increased by 1.5-2 times in the immediate future, this will certainly be impressive support additional to the food supplied to the armed forces on the basis of state orders.

Spring is at its peak, and it was late this year at that. This is why the schedule of field work is extremely tight. Every day, every hour of daylight is precious to us. Laborers of the military agricultural enterprises all understand this well. There is the immutable truth, after all, that a year's supply of food hinges on a single spring day.



## INTERREGIONAL MILITARY ISSUES

### Conflict Over Black Sea Fleet Said to Be 'Unavoidable'

94UM0397A Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
13 Apr 94 p 3

[Article by Vladimir Maryukha and Grigoriy Nesmyanovich: "Black Sea Fleet True to the Oath Once Taken: That Is What the Military Council of the Black Sea Fleet Said About Its Position on the Incident in Odessa"]

[Text] "The unpunished actions of the Ukrainian special forces in Odessa took place with the connivance of the Ukrainian Naval Forces under Vice-Admiral Bezkorovaynyy," according to a statement of the military council of the Black Sea Fleet to the presidents of Russia and Ukraine. But Chairman of the State Duma Ivan Rybkin is certain that forces striving to disrupt the pending meeting of the heads of state of the CIS were interested in this incident. Russia, in turn, is therefore striving to minimize the political aspect of the actions of the Ukrainian special forces.

But such a striving cannot be seen on the Ukrainian side. On the contrary, the commanding officer of the forces of Odessa Military District has already assigned a new commander, Capt. 1st Rank V. Marchenko, to the division that has been renamed 1st Brigade of ships for the protection of the water area. Ukrainian press services are disseminating statements to the effect that the former commander of the division, Capt. 1st Rank Oleg Feoktistov, has been hospitalized with the diagnosis of "acute alcoholic poisoning" and not a word about the handcuffs that apparently also "poisoned" the Russian officer. There is also no mention of the fact that the Russian seamen were given an ultimatum: either swear allegiance to Ukraine or be expelled beyond the boundaries of the republic. According to available information, only two officers of the division agreed to change flags.

One really ought to have forgotten this incident for the sake of peace and agreement between the two neighboring Slavic states. But one should have looked into the causes and sought to find the guilty parties. The Ukrainian side is resisting this, however. The authorities in Kiev forced Adm. Feliks Gromov, commander in chief of the Naval Forces of the Russian Federation, to change the originally planned route of his trip to settle the conflict, forbidding him to visit Odessa. Yesterday the commander in chief and the special ambassador Yuriy Dubinin arrived in Sevastopol to discuss the situation with Adm. Eduard Baltin, commanding officer of the Black Sea Fleet.

There is still more alarming information from the south of Ukraine. Sources close to the staff of the Ukrainian Naval Forces report that an action similar to the one in Odessa is being prepared in Izmail with respect to a brigade of river vessels, the personnel of which have declared a resolute protest in connection with the provocation in Odessa. The

special forces of the Bolgrad Airborne Brigade that "distinguished themselves" in the assault of the division of ships mothballed in Odessa have already been put in a state of combat readiness....

### Description of Tension Surrounding Black Sea Fleet

94UM0397B Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian  
No 74, 21 Apr 94 p 3

[Article by Yuriy Golotyuk: "Firing Training Turning into Combat Operations: the Seamen of the Black Sea Fleet Warn: 'The Ukrainian Side Will Lose, Although There Will Be No Victors'"]

[Text] The situation developing with respect to the Black Sea Fleet was more and more reminiscent of an undeclared war last week. Ukrainian fighters patrolling the skies over Sevastopol with their full combat load. Attempts to pursue and seize the hydrographic ship "Cheleken" that were like a scene from a pirate adventure novel. And the prohibition by the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense against ships of the Black Sea Fleet entering the ports of Odessa, Kherson, Nikolayev, and Izmail out of fear that a "Russian landing force" would come ashore there....

Early morning. With the first rays of the sun rising over Sevastopol, the guard ships "Ladnyy" and "Pytlivyy" raise anchor and go to sea. They will execute a routine training mission to search for and "destroy" a submarine of a hypothetical enemy. But on the ships, as usual, is a full load of munitions that are by no means for training.

In response to the question of whether there is a chance that in the course of the exercises the "Ladnyy" and "Pytlivyy" might encounter ships of the Ukrainian Naval Forces, we were given the answer: "In principle there is; they do not tell us about their plans. The command ship 'Slavutich' of the Ukrainian Naval Forces may be somewhere around here right now. If we do encounter it, then nothing will really happen, for we are civilized people. Although it will all depend upon the actions of the Ukrainian side. Recently, during the performance of a training mission to destroy air targets, a fighter of the Ukrainian Air Defense Forces constantly circled over the 'Pytlivyy.' It left for its base only after the air defense system of the guard ship fired missiles at training targets. In general, the pilot could not fail to understand that such games do not lead to anything good."

Something else that happened in Odessa could have ended badly. The seizure of subunits of the Black Sea Fleet by Ukrainian military formations evoked an extremely painful reaction in the Fleet. At a meeting of officers of the Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol, warship commanders did not hide the fact that in the event of new provocations they are prepared to carry out any order of the Fleet commander, including the use of combat weapons against ships of the Ukrainian Naval Forces. At the same time, the position of Ukraine itself does nothing to lessen tension. "There was no incident in Odessa," Vice-Adm. Vladimir Bezkorovaynyy, commanding officer of the Ukrainian Naval Forces, continues to insist. "There was a gross

violation of the constitution and laws of Ukraine by individual officials of the Black Sea Fleet." The actions of the Ukrainian side correspond to these assessments. The situation remains tense in Izmail, where a brigade of river craft of the Black Sea Fleet is stationed. Ukraine is still trying unilaterally to subordinate this part of the Fleet to itself, despite the fact that immediately after the events in Odessa officers from Izmail issued an official warning to the leadership of the Ukrainian Naval Forces that "if something similar is undertaken with respect to our unit and our family members, then we will act in accordance with the law and military regulations, even to the point of using weapons."

The recent bosom friends, who knew each other even in school and went to the Fleet together as green lieutenants, are beginning to see each other as enemies. They were separated by oaths. Most of them swore allegiance to the former Black Sea Fleet back in the time of the Soviet Union. A few have sworn a new oath of allegiance to Ukraine. "We will not go on board an enemy ship," declared Capt. 2nd Rank Aleksandr Petrov when it was proposed that he and other members of the Black Sea Fleet who refused to swear allegiance to Ukraine go on board the "Slavutich." The members of the Black Sea Fleet are even trying to do everything they can to send their sons, who because of their registration in Sevastopol are considered to be citizens of Ukraine and accordingly are supposed to serve in the Ukrainian Armed Forces, to serve in the Russian Army.

"Delay in the negotiations on the problem of the Black Sea Fleet may lead to the most unpredictable conflicts," the officers of the Black Sea Fleet warn officially. "This conflict (deliberately planned) is pushing us toward counteractions. At the same time, one should keep in mind that Ukraine will inevitably be the losing side." By the way, the sailors of the Black Sea Fleet themselves recognize that if, God forbid, they are unable to avoid such a conflict, then it will simply be ridiculous to speak of someone winning."

#### Garrison Life at Skrunda Radar Facility

944D0022A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
6 May 94 p 2

[Article by Sergey Knyazkov and Vasilii Fatigarov: "Skrunda: The Supersecret Facility of World Renown"; "Garrison Life"]

[Text] *At one time the radar station located in the small Latvian post of Skrunda was considered a supersecret facility. Today, thanks to the ups and downs of Russian-Latvian negotiations, its renown is all but scandalous. But it has already been decided that the radar station will operate for another 4 years, and 18 months will be devoted to disassembly of the equipment. But behind the "technical aspect of the question," the high contracting sides have somehow entirely forgotten about the Skrunda garrison, the service members who to this day regularly go to work at the radar.*

The unit commander, Lt-Col Aleksandr Nikitin, met us at the staff building. He looked exhausted. They night before

a piece of equipment had gone down, and he had to rush all over the place so that everything would be normal by morning. You see, despite the political situation, the radar "garrison" continues to perform its assigned mission. Alert duty is pulled daily by 4 crews on 12-hour shifts.

Before, serving at Skrunda was considered a privilege, mainly because of the comfortable geographic location of the garrison, the availability of housing, and convenient transportation to major cities. And topflight specialists served here. Even today practically 90 percent of personnel have an academic education.

Meanwhile, once at inter-government negotiations, seeking to "demilitarize" the facility, Latvia asked Russia to replace the military specialists who maintained the radar with civilian ones. But later Latvia was to learn that this proposal was unrealistic. Specialists of this type are trained only in military VUZ (military institutes of higher learning), but even after graduation it takes at least two years before a young officer is allowed on alert duty. Even then, as the unit commander explained, at first he has the skills only for a few operations. But specialists such as Lt-Cols Viktor Mikhaylov, Leonid Zhukov, Valentin Churkin, Pyotr Samorodov, and Majors Pyotr Palamar-chuk and Viktor Dedoriv can tell even from the behavior of the apparatus where they should look for or even where they should expect a defect. They're the ones who keep it all going.

Incidentally, in the period of breakup of the Union, many specialists from the station went into the armies of the newly formed sovereign states, mainly Ukraine. Thus it turned out that the unit was manned by about 60-70 percent with men from that republic. This is explained quite easily by the fact that radar specialists were trained at Kharkov and Zhitomir. "Some of them didn't care for the Ukrainian Army, and tried to return," Lt-Col Aleksandr Nikitin recalled, "but the command figures that for these people there is no turning back."

Now only the most reliable remain to work at the facility. And besides alert duty, they still have to protect the military camp, an territory of 42 hectares. Even the wives and children of the officers have joined the ranks, so to speak. This was forced largely by the absence of replacements of compulsory service troops for two years.

We spoke with two nice women in military uniform, the Ryzhikovs, mother and daughter. The officer's wife, Larisa Sergeyevna, is PFC, and works as an expeditor at the communications center, while her daughter Larisa is a private and radio telegraph operator. They like the service. "We feel a real army kinship!" In addition, the unit command has tried not only to resolve problems involving the training of female specialists, but also to maximally settle day-to-day problems. We were told by the unit psychologist, Lt-Col Sergey Pakhomov, "There is a kindergarten, grade school, club, music school, and the children's Russian folk ensemble "Kuderyshki" operating in the garrison."

In each of the 10 residential buildings for officers, small, cozy food stores have opened their doors. A joint Russian-Latvian enterprise created on the basis of the military store provides the wares. But then, the freshest dairy products can also be purchased at the garrison KPP [traffic regulating point] from residents of local villages.

It is too bad that we did not manage to see our interlocutors at their combat posts. On orders from Moscow, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA journalists were not allowed near the operating radar "Dnestr-M." But we did visit the new one, the "Daryal." It is a sad sight, an abandoned, first-class military facility. It is hard to realize that life will not pulse after all in the heart of this mighty, nearly hundred-meter high building. And how much manpower and resources are still needed to disassemble it all!

"We missed our chance to come to an agreement on the fate of the radar" the officers escorting us said with one voice. "The decision about mothballing and disassembly should have been made in 1991-1992, when there were contract organizations and builders here."

Well, that's life. It remains only to repeat that the outmoded station "Dnestr-M" in Skrunda will keep working for another 4 years, and then the entire Commonwealth of Independent States, Russia included, will be without the means of detecting attacking missiles on this flank. It is possible to restore the former degree of protection only by spending new, enormous sums. But you know, it all might have been different if we had shown political far-sightedness back then.

## UKRAINE

### Lopata, Directorate Heads Discuss Support Problems

94UM0381A Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Ukrainian  
19 Apr 94 pp 1-2

[Article by Captain Ihor Melnychuk, Press Service of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine: "The Problems of the Armed Forces—The Unvarnished Truth Presented at the Meeting of the Chiefs of the Main Directorates of the Ministry of Defense with Journalists"]

[Text] Colonel-General Anatoliy Lopata, chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces and first deputy minister of defense of Ukraine, opened the meeting by stressing that the conversation would be frank. Indeed, there has long been a need for such a meeting of the chiefs of the leading directorates of the military establishment with the representatives of the country's mass media. Questions arise every day concerning some aspect or another of the activity of the Armed Forces. Unfortunately, lacking reliable information, journalists often publish reports on the military in newspapers or in radio and television broadcasts that are not completely accurate.

"And when we hear our work being judged unfairly, this upsets us and dampens our enthusiasm," stated Col. Gen. A. Lopata in his opening remarks. He then added: "We have invited you here so that we can give candid answers

to any questions you may have; so that you are not forced to guess at things on your own. We want the people of Ukraine to have the true, unvarnished, but also undistorted facts about what is happening in our Ukrainian Army."

Let me begin by saying that the meeting was a success. But, judge for yourselves.

The first thing that interested the journalists was whether there were any problems this year with the conscription of youths into the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

The chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine admitted that there were some problems:

"But you need to understand what is causing these problems. The current conscription pool in Ukraine is extremely large. More than 800,000 youths are eligible to be drafted into our army. But existing legislation, which provides for granting deferments from the draft to many categories of young people, leaves us with only 12 percent of the total figure. Unfortunately, this is not enough.

"This was what forced us to resort to an unauthorized measure—to review the decision of the Supreme Council that the term of service be one and one-half years and move to increase it to two years. We were compelled to take this step in order to maintain the combat readiness of the Armed Forces of Ukraine at the necessary level. That is why those conscripted in the spring of 1992 are only now being discharged into the reserves."

Col. Gen. Anatoliy Lopata then reminded those present of the directive issued by President Yuriy Meshkov of the Republic of Crimea demanding that the peninsula's youths be conscripted only into units that are stationed in the autonomous republic. The president of Ukraine issued a decree abolishing this directive as one that violates the laws of Ukraine. As a result, conscription in the Republic of Crimea is now proceeding in normal fashion and in accordance with Ukrainian laws. Crimeans will serve on the whole territory of Ukraine.

Maj. Gen. Valeriy Venher, chief of the Main Organizational and Mobilization Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, amplified on the answer of the chief of the General Staff:

"Currently, the draft is proceeding according to plan. So far, the plan has not been frustrated in any way. I expect that we shall fulfill the conscription plan.

"The process of discharging those who have completed their term of service into the reserves is also under way. By 3 May of this year, the last soldier drafted in the spring of 1992 will have been discharged from the Armed Forces."

The journalists addressed their next question to Col. Gen. Hryhoriy Mikhaylichenko, deputy minister of defense for rear services and chief of Rear Services of the Armed Forces of Ukraine:

"As we know, the former Kiev Military District included five military state farms, which helped to relieve the



people of the problem of feeding the army. How do things stand today with the army's agricultural enterprises?"

Col. Gen. H. Mikhaylichenko:

"The Armed Forces, like the whole Ukrainian people, have many social problems. As things stood on 1 April, the Ministry of Defense had received from the government only 43 percent of the funds appropriated in the budget for the maintenance of military personnel.

"In spite of this, we are making every effort to ensure that military personnel are fed properly. Thus, officers, warrant officers, and reenlisted servicemen receive food rations. Term servicemen are also provided with standard rations. The military's state farms help to solve these problems in today's difficult circumstances. There are currently twenty farms that belong to the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Actually, twenty-one, because a few days ago, a collective farm in the town of Brody in Lviv Oblast joined our ranks. Its members requested unanimously to be transferred under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Defense.

"What percentage of goods do the military's state farms supply? They provide the army with enough meat for 70 days, milk for virtually the whole year (345 days), eggs for 122 days (at four eggs per week for each term serviceman), oil for 173 days, potatoes and vegetables for 22 days. Obviously, this significantly reduces the problem of providing the troops with food products.

"We are currently building an enterprise to process agricultural production in partnership with a foreign firm. This enterprise will fully process meat, leather, milk, and grain crops. This will significantly improve our ability to provision military personnel."

The chief of Rear Services of the Armed Forces of Ukraine assured the journalists attending the meeting and asked them to reassure the parents of military personnel, especially term servicemen, in their reports that no matter how difficult things may be, there will be no irregularities in the normal feeding, medical care, and material provisioning of personnel.

Volodymyr Chykalik, the military commentator of *VECHIRNIY KYIV*, passed on to Col. Gen. H. Mikhaylichenko a question that had been addressed to his newspaper by the personnel of the missile cruiser *Ukrayina*, which is undergoing repairs in Mykolayiv: Why do Ukrainian sailors have to pay the Black Sea Fleet for their medical treatment?

Hryhoriy Mykolayovych was well informed about this problem:

"This matter will be settled. We will definitely reach an agreement with the command of the Black Sea Fleet. It is inconceivable that military personnel should have to pay for their medical care. By the way, our medical facilities provide Black Sea Fleet personnel with free medical treatment."

The next question posed by the journalists concerned the introduction of a new uniform. They wanted to know

whether the deadline for switching to the new uniform, which had been set in a recent presidential decree, would be kept.

Col. Gen. H. Mikhaylichenko:

"The new military uniform for the Armed Forces of Ukraine has been designed and is being introduced. During the first half of this year, uniforms will be sewn for generals and the officer corps at military institutes and schools and for top personnel at the Ministry of Defense, the military districts, and the different corps. Uniforms for everybody else will be sewn in 1995.

"The necessary cloth has already been issued to the districts and they have begun to implement the president's decree. But a shortage of funds has slowed this process.

"We have taken a number of steps to make the uniforms of military school cadets more attractive. These uniforms will be very similar to those worn by officers. In addition, on 1 September, students will be issued camouflage uniforms. Term servicemen will wear laced army boots instead of high boots [kyrzovi], jackets of coat-quality cloth instead of greatcoats, and the uncomfortable parade-dress single-breasted jacket will be replaced by an elegant, youthful jacket. Funds are a problem, but we are getting things done.

"The uniforms are the subject of a great deal of talk. Especially, should there be fur caps or not, and why do generals need leather coats? It would be interesting to hear the opinion of the chief of rear services on this subject."

"The leather coats have been introduced as a representative item. They are not included in the standard issue. The generals order these coats at their own expense. In my opinion, it is a good thing for the minister of defense and other generals when they travel abroad to represent our country in such high-quality uniforms. This adds to Ukraine's prestige."

Col. Gen. Anatoliy Lopata noted that very many Ukrainians have leather clothing and no one criticizes them for this, whereas there was immediate criticism of the army. He added:

"In the past, every general in the Soviet Army had the right to buy a full, better-quality field uniform and a better-quality rain cloak at his own expense. For some reason, no one seemed to notice this then."

Col. Gen. H. Mikhaylichenko:

"Apropos the fur caps. Such caps were part of traditional Ukrainian attire and were worn by the Cossacks. Abolishing them caused concern even outside the military. Many civilians appealed to the Ministry of Defense to restore the fur caps as part of the uniform for generals and colonels. There were also countless requests regarding this from more junior officers. Like the braid worn by generals, the fur caps serve as kind of incentive. Young officers inherently yearn to acquire these symbols of rank. That is precisely why the commission approved them as part of the new uniform."

From problems pertaining to rear services, the journalists moved on to purely military issues. Especially those that concern armaments. Lt. Gen. Lev Hnatenko, chief of the Armaments Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, held his own in a battle of sorts.

Lyubov Yanyuk, the newspaper UKRAYINA MOLODA:

"If you please, a few words about the progress of nuclear disarmament."

"We are adhering to the schedule for dismantling the nuclear warheads that was agreed upon. Despite the fact that there is some deviation on the part of Russia, which is not adhering to the schedule for delivering heat-generating assemblies to Ukrainian nuclear electric power stations. This issue is currently being decided at the government level. It will be settled in the very near future."

Marat Pohoryelov, Ukrainian Radio:

"What is our strategy for our own armaments? What will we do when the weapons we have become obsolete?"

Lt. Gen. L. Hnatenko:

"I am not revealing any secrets when I tell you that it is very expensive to manufacture weapons. No country, with the exception of the former USSR and the U.S., makes its own weapons from start to finish. The situation in the USSR was such that no one republic could manufacture weapons independently. In other words, Ukraine does not have a single assembly plant, although approximately 25 percent of different components of various weapons are manufactured here.

"We conducted a study of all types of weapons and assessed the situation. This served as the basis for working out a state program of weapons development up to the year 2000 and a long-term program up to the year 2010.

"Right now we are trying to set up weapons production at a maximum number of facilities. This question has been partially resolved. The Ukrainian T-80 tank is being successfully produced in Kharkiv, Ukrainian shipyards are building military ships; the best military transport airplane, the AN-70, has been built in Kiev; radar systems are being developed, as well as a Ukrainian satellite, which will be launched very soon. But, as everywhere, there are many problems.

"There is only one solution. In order to maintain the combat readiness of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, we must modernize our armaments by making use of the facilities of our repair enterprises. Such projects exist, but their implementation will depend on the availability of financing.

"So far, we have financed only 24.3 percent of the scientific-research and research-design projects that need to be done and bought only 8.8 percent of the weapons and spare parts that we require. We are trying to obtain the rest from extrabudgetary sources—by selling old weaponry and equipment that has done its job to the national economy. But this does not bring in enough money to allow us to execute our plan."

The journalists were also interested in how things stand with the transfer of officers and warrant officers home from abroad. Lt. Gen. Hryhoriy Dyachuk, chief of the Main Directorate for Personnel [Cadres] of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, gave a detailed answer:

"More than 26,000 officers and warrant officers have already returned to Ukraine. This process is continuing. Earlier reports put the figure of servicemen who want to return to Ukraine at some 140,000. But this figure was inaccurate. According to the data that I have, only another 10,000 officers and warrant officers, who submitted requests for transfers, have not yet returned.

"There is indeed a circumstance that complicates this process. Under Article 2 of the Law of Ukraine 'On Ukrainian Citizenship,' we can avoid bureaucratic red tape in transferring personnel who filed a request to serve in the Armed Forces of Ukraine before 1 October 1992. Later, the Cabinet of Ministers came to our assistance and extended this deadline to 1 October 1993. And now? The Supreme Council and the president have to extend this deadline once again."

Unsurprisingly, among the questions that were of interest to journalists was one concerning the construction of housing for military personnel. Col. Gen. A. Lopata, the chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and first deputy minister of defense, described how this problem is being solved.

Anatoliy Vasylyovych noted that this is probably the most difficult problem facing the military. There are close to 80,000 military personnel without housing in our army. A shortage of funds is making this problem difficult to solve. Earlier, 28,000 apartments were built every year; now only 20 percent of this number is being built.

Col. Gen. Lopata stressed that 19.98 trillion karbovantsi are needed to carry out the housing construction program. The amount appropriated for the Ministry of Defense is only 1.4 trillion, or 17.2 percent of sum it needs.

Col. Gen. H. Mikhaylichenko described how the Ministry of Defense plans to solve this financial problem. He said that this matter was discussed at a meeting with Deputy Prime Minister Valeriy Shmarov. In addition, the minister of defense will report on the state of financing in the Armed Forces and on providing them with fuel and lubricants at a meeting of the Presidium of the Cabinet of Ministers on 18 April. Also, General of the Army Vitaliy Radetsky has made a request for interest-free credit to pay off debts. This credit will be granted soon.

The journalists were also interested in military education, its future and its problems. Maj. Gen. Viktor Hudym gave the attending journalists a relatively detailed report:

"On the whole, the system of military education created in Ukraine is progressive. It is designed to provide the Armed Forces with officer cadres, but many mistakes were made when it was set up.

"Taking into account my own concept of military education, I believe that we should not have copied the system in

existence in Western countries, including in the United States. The standard of officer training in the former Soviet Union was high—a fact that even Western experts acknowledge. All that needed to be done was to incorporate in it the latest attainments in the field of science and to assure that the diplomas were convertible. Instead, the creation of a new system, the creation of new educational institutions within its framework and the elimination of existing schools resulted in the loss of valuable professorial and teaching personnel and the destruction of the invaluable material and technical base of many higher educational institutions.

"Decisions were made without proper justification to dismantle costly permanently installed equipment and to move it to other locations. Some of this equipment never reached its new destination. Not all of the equipment that did arrive has been put into working order.

"Schools that we still need today were closed. Thus, the only general military school, which was located in Kiev, was closed. In Odessa, they began training specialists for the Land Forces without sufficient preparation. A decision was made to close the Zhytomyr Higher Radar School of the Air Defense Forces—the only such school in the former Soviet Union, which trained specialists for the space forces. But no provision has been made for training these specialists elsewhere. The Kharkiv Higher Command Tank School was eliminated. The training of these specialists has been assigned to the Kiev Tank and Technical School, which used to train deputy weapons commanders and not commanders of tank platoons. This school lacks the proper field training base and many other things that Kharkiv had. Now the Kharkiv base has been handed over to the National Guard, the border troops, and others. Meanwhile, we are already feeling an acute need of commanders of tank subunits.

"In addition, the change to a six-year course of study means that there will be no officers graduating in some specialties in 1997 and 1998. Particularly, those in specialties that were not previously trained by the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

"It is necessary to amend certain government decisions, revoke the corresponding decree of the Cabinet of Ministers, and solve other problems jointly with the Main Directorate for Personnel.

"We have no facilities at which to train psychologists, professors, and instructors. A decision was adopted to establish the Institute for the humanities in Kiev. In principle, this institution has already been created. What still needs to be decided is the question of site and material base.

"The next question that must be resolved immediately is how to disburden the Odessa and Kiev land forces institutes. The meeting of the Military College of the Ministry

of Defense on 22 April will be devoted to the problems of military education. I believe that most important issues will be settled at this meeting."

...The meeting came to an end, but the journalists still had many questions in their notebooks. Col. Gen. Anatoliy Lopata assured us that we would get answers to these questions in future briefings. And there will be plenty of them inasmuch as such meetings are very productive both for the journalists and for the military.

### **Bizhan on Outcome of Black Sea Fleet Talks**

944D0031B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
29 Apr 94 p 3

[Report by Grigoriy Nesmyanovich: "The Fleet Is Not Just Being Divided; It is Actually Growing"]

[Text] In Kiev they are continuing to comment on the results of the Russian-Ukrainian talks on the Black Sea Fleet.

At a briefing in the Ministry of Internal Affairs Col-Gen Ivan Bizhan, deputy minister of defense of Ukraine, said that the Russian delegation had not been prepared to resolve the issues to be discussed. It proposed an unacceptable option whereby the Russian portion of the Black Sea Fleet would be deployed at bases in the Crimea and the Ukrainian share would be outside the Crimea. Furthermore, I. Bizhan noted, it could only be a matter of the brief presence of Russian seamen and ships within Ukraine. With respect to Sevastopol, the possibility has not been ruled out of temporary joint basing of the Russian and the Ukrainian parts only in different bays. Major disagreement also arose in approaches to resolution of the problem of the coastal infrastructure.

As of 20 April the number of ships in the Black Sea Fleet was 833. Of these 164 belonged to Ukraine, 669 to Russia. It was planned for Russia to pay for 31.7 percent of the ships, which were to go to Ukraine under the treaty.

In general, representatives of the Ukrainian Navy have long advanced the idea that the combat strength of the Fleet is a myth. The fact is stressed that the average age of the ships is 15-20 years. In recent years funds have not been allocated for their maintenance. If this continues, the Fleet will "go to the bottom" on its own by the year 2000. Ukraine's Navy, however, which commemorated the second anniversary of its founding in April, continues to be replenished with modern ships. And not so few of them—the administrative ship Slavuch, the patrol vessel Getman Sagaydachnyy, the airfoil landing ship Donetsk. The missile cruiser Ukraina will join them in the future. The crews of the patrol vessel Getman Bayda-Vinevetskiy, the small ASW ships Lutsk, Ternopol, Lvov, Zaporozhskaya Sech... are being completed and completely manned. And so, rumors of a premature end of the Fleet may turn out to be greatly exaggerated.



### Morozov Performance as Defense Minister Assailed

944D0020A Moscow ROSSIYA in Russian No 17,  
4-10 May 94 (signed to press 3 May 94) p 5

[Article by Vladimir Kolinko: "Former Minister's Legacy"]

[Text] Kiev—A portrait of former Defense Minister Konstantin Morozov, a principal candidate for the office of president of Ukraine, has been published in the nationalist UKRAINSKAYA GAZETA. The ex-minister has been demonstrating an enviable political assertiveness as of late. He is sharply criticizing the present Ukrainian leaders. In a book that has just appeared, for example, he ruthlessly shows the hypocrisy of the president of Ukraine, publishing details, carefully concealed by the Ukrainian side, of the Massandra negotiations between Yeltsin and Kravchuk. The ex-minister's critical attacks are being given credence, it would seem. But is there anything positive and creative in his political experience permitting a moral claim to the presidency?

...Major General Konstantin Morozov, commander of the 17th Air Army, was appointed minister of defense after the August putsch of 1991, when he appeared to be virtually the sole commander in Ukraine who supported the idea of the creation of independent armed forces. In fact, Leonid Kravchuk had no choice in this appointment. The main role at that time was performed not by military professionalism and breadth of outlook but political orientation and trustworthiness.

Virtually the sole achievement of developed socialism in the USSR were the armed forces. Ukraine had the best part of them, both organizationally and technically. So that in the creation of its own armed forces there was no need to perfect or modernize anything. It was sufficient to preserve what had been acquired, changing merely the system of the chain of command.

But the minister of defense went his own way. He began the organizational development of the armed forces with the ideologization of the army. Ukraine had decided that the soldier's main weapon was his selfless patriotism. A so-called sociopsychological service of the armed forces was formed. Whereas previously political officers had coached the career personnel in the postulates of the classics of Marxism-Leninism, they now began with the same zeal to inculcate the ideas of Ukrainian sovereignty. A campaign to eradicate from people's memory the heroic pages of the history of the Soviet Army was mounted. The straightforward implantation of the traditions of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army and the ideology of Petlyura, Bandera, and Mukhevich began in place of this. Konstantin Morozov appointed to the position of leader of the sociopsychological service Vladimir Mulyavu, who had in two years made dizzying career progress from sergeant of the reserve to major general in the field.

This patriotization turned out as might have been expected: nihilism, increased desertion, and the flourishing of hazing.

Konstantin Morozov removed from the leadership of the Ministry of Defense the best professionals—for, more often than not, the simple reason that against their background the professional level of the minister himself seemed quite insipid. Thus General Sobkov, chief of the Main Staff, General Oleynik, deputy minister for armament, and General Ignatenko, deputy minister for personnel, quit their posts.

An idea that has as yet no counterpart in the armed forces of other countries, on the other hand, was realized: unification of the navy and the air defense forces. It was in this way confirmed that in military matters Ukraine would be going its own, original way.

Considerable losses were sustained by military research and military education thanks to the activity of the newly fledged General Yuriy Prokofyev, who was appointed chief of the Ministry of Defense Directorate of Education. Of the 34 academies and schools, he retained only nine military training institutions, having eliminated, for example, the Kiev Combined-Arms Command Military School, one of the best in the former USSR, and having destroyed during the reorganization the unique equipment of a number of training centers.

...Mariya Cherednichenko, an inhabitant of the Onufriyevka community of Kirovograd Oblast, believes that army commanders made her son a criminal. After having been drafted into the army, the young man ended up in a strategic aviation unit not far from Kiev. The Busol association, which uses military aircraft for commercial transportation, operates at the long-range bomber unit base, apparently. The stores for housing arms and military equipment were stuffed with footwear, clothing, perfumery, home electronics, sugar, butter—goods which practical fellows from the Caucasus were ferrying on military aircraft on commercial routes known only to them. At night the soldiers would be roused at the command of toughs in leather jackets to load up another aircraft.

Guarding the storehouse with the commercial odds and ends, Mariya Cherednichenko's son was unable to withstand the temptation, stole, was caught, and was committed to trial. "I am not excusing him," his grief-stricken mother says. "But I did not send him to the army for him to guard the property of profiteers and mafiosi who had built a thieves' nest in an operational military unit..."

In Konstantin Morozov's years at the helm of power the army became a huge proving ground for economic activity.

Inasmuch as in the former Soviet Union Ukraine had, as a consequence of its geographical location, been the key component in a possible conflict between the countries of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, the republic was literally larded with the most modern military equipment and represented a principal arsenal of the USSR. Aside from this, an immense quantity of military equipment and munitions had been concentrated here in recent years in connection with the withdrawal of Soviet forces from the Warsaw Pact countries and Germany. With Ukraine's proclamation of independence, all this material wealth became its property.

And, simultaneously, a base for criminal business.

As Grigoriy Olmechenko, colonel of the Security Service and people's deputy of Ukraine, believes, a substantial part



of the \$12-16 billion which annually ends up in overseas banks in the personal accounts of a few hundred citizens of Ukraine is the result of commercial deals involving military hardware and equipment.

Theft and economic crime have affected all army strata: from the privates through the generals. The crime list abounds in reports of the sale by soldiers of grenades, automatic weapons, pistols, and grenade launchers stolen from military stores. The level of the "commercial activity" of the officers is somewhat different: the sale for cash of trucks, tractors, bulldozers, equipment, gasoline, and building materials which have allegedly been written off.

As far as the generals are concerned, the horizons of activity are far wider here.

In accordance with an order of Konstantin Morozov, a Commercial Center for the sale of military equipment and weapons was formed more than two years ago under the auspices of the Ministry of Defense. The monies earned were to have been channeled into the construction of housing for the servicemen (several tens of thousands of officer's families are without apartments in Ukraine today).

But it was ascertained right from the start of the center's activity that even the highly modest monies which it was earning were being channeled mainly into the replenishment of accounts in various banks, foreign banks included, for the purchase of prestige automobiles for the generals. The Commercial Center was created, incidentally, in defiance of legislation of Ukraine, was not a legal entity, and was not, therefore, licensed for the activity in which it was engaged. The deputy prosecutor general wrote to Konstantin Morozov about this 18 months ago. He did not receive a response to his message, and he himself was retired shortly after.

The Commercial Center, meanwhile, was involved in very curious actions. Such as, for example, the deal involving the sale of 13 warships, including the Leningrad, Provornyy, and Komsomolets Ukrainy ASW ships, the Dmitriy Galkin tender, and several patrol craft for a total of... just R35.1 million! In experts' opinion, this is tens of times less than their true worth. At least, as was ascertained subsequently, the Ukraina-AKHTIAR joint-stock partnership, which acted as the middleman, made some R129 million for just two ships from these 13.

At approximately the same time the Commercial Center sold various authorities eight military bases and three individual buildings and did so in such a way, what is more, that the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine was caused a loss of more than R110 million.

Such transactions followed one after the other. Information to the effect that approximately 80 tanks were sold abroad last year and that the proceeds constituted only \$375,000 filtered into the Ukrainian press.

And although the Commercial Center was ultimately disbanded, the public never heard of any of its leaders being punished.

Although, no. There was one such instance, but in accordance with the well-known rule of "rewarding the nonparticipants, punishing the innocent." This happened when 23 Tu-16 long-range bombers were written off at a military unit located in Lvov Oblast. The Commercial Center concluded a recycling contract at that time not with the state-run Ukrtvortsvetinet, as required by law, but with the Asper (Kiev) small enterprise. The value of the 23 bombers being written off was put at 1.2 million Ukrainian karbovantsy. According to the commodity-exchange rate, however, a tonne of such scrap metal has a value of not less than \$1,000. The agreement was signed by the leaders of the Commercial Center with the blessing of Lieutenant General G. Zhivitsa, deputy chief of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine Main Staff. When, following the intervention of the Security Service of Ukraine, however, this deal was canceled, the person punished was... Major Gubanov, the commander of the military unit at which the Tu-16 bombers had been based. A person who had had nothing to do with the deal concluded in Kiev.

General Vladimir Tolubko, leader of the "hawks" in the Ukrainian parliament, who has insistently demanded the preservation of nuclear weapons in Ukraine, has prospered and continues to prosper. Appointed 18 months ago the leader of the Kharkov Military University, he has shown himself there to be primarily a magnificent businessman. And it is not only a question of his apartment-dacha epic, which was successful, but which raised a considerable clamor. The general has conducted a number of large-scale commercial transactions: He has sold for a pittance practically new trucks in the guise of ones that had been written off and leased to commercial entities premises of the military university with an area of more than 3,000 square meters (what price a military secret here!). And the university understands full well why tens of millions of karbovantsy have been transferred to the Dobrodiy Commercial Bank: The general himself is a cofounder of this bank. I have absolutely no reason to believe that the former minister was involved in this malfeasance or that he is in the least way mixed up in dirty machinations. But what use is a leader who cannot bring if only elementary order to bear in the area entrusted to him?

## BELARUS

### Concern over Large Number of Spring 1994 Discharges

94UM0408A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
8 Apr 94 p 2

[Article by Valeriy Kovalev, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent: "Half of the Soldiers and Sergeants in Belorussia Are Being Discharged into the Reserve"]

[Text] This spring, for the first time servicemen in compulsory term of service from two call-ups—the spring and fall of 1992—will be discharged into the reserve immediately from the Belorussian Army. The Ministry of Defense believes that this may seriously affect the combat readiness of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Belorussia—after all, half of the soldiers and sergeants are to leave over the

course of two months. Things will also be difficult this spring for the republic's military commissariats—the call-up plan has been increased considerably, while the number of draftees has remained essentially as before.

## BALTIC STATES

### New Border Guards Commander Appointed

944K1206C Riga LABRIT in Latvian 16 Apr 94 p 1

[Interview with Janis Adamsons by Ieva Stale: "Border Guards Have New Commander"]

[Text] On Thursday, Defense Minister V. Pavlovskis signed an order appointing Command Captain Janis Adamsons, the present Deputy Commander of the Naval Forces to the position of Border Guards Brigade Commander. Thus, control of the land borders will be overseen by a navy man. In this connection, "Labrit" is offering a brief short-order interview with the new Border Guards Brigade Commander.

[Stale] Did you agree to this position willingly?

[Adamsons] I am an officer, and in the army it is assumed that the orders of a higher ranking officer are to be followed, regardless of whether they concern changing over to another post or retirement. I was satisfied with my present post and also with the work I had contributed in forming the Naval Forces. The actual offer to become the Border Guards Brigade Commander was unexpected, although I am a professional coast guard.

[Stale] How did you become a coast guard by profession?

[Adamsons] I studied at the Russian Naval War School. For 13 years, I served in the Far East in various leadership positions as a coast guard. I was last stationed in Russia at the Coast Guard Training Center in Nahodka, where I served as deputy head of the training center.

[Stale] In your opinion, what is the weakest point in the present overland border protection plan?

[Adamsons] I will be able to answer this question one month from now, after I have familiarized myself with all overland border problems. I guarantee that the information will be available to the press.

[Stale] What are the main activity objectives of the new Border Guards Brigade Commander?

[Adamsons] To strengthen overland border control, protection and defense, involving the participation of those people who are serving in the Border Guard at present. The main objective is to organize regular cooperation among the state institutions involved with border control—the Ministry of Internal Affairs, National Guard, Customs. Until now, while serving in the Naval Forces, there was good cooperation among these institutions. I hope the situation continues.

## CAUCASIAN STATES

### Talks in Bishkek, Karabakh Fighting Continues

944D0021A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 5 May 94 p 1

[Article by Kirill Petrov: "Talks in Bishkek Started"; "Accompanied by Battles in Nagorno-Karabakh"]

[Text] We have already gotten used to the fact that the news from the Karabakh conflict zone is contradictory. The present spring campaign is no exception.

According to the press service of the Defense Ministry of Azerbaijan, Armenian armed formations are attacking in the Tertery and Agdam axes using artillery and armor. The same source asserts that the Armenians lost 50 soldiers and one tank in the offensive.

But the press service of the NKR [Nagorno-Karabakh Republic] Army staff reports essentially the opposite: The Azerbaijan Army is trying to push an advance in the northeastern sector of the front, but Karabakh subunits are holding up its attack. Both sides are suffering losses.

One thing is clear: The front line is hardly changing. The May burst of activity in the Karabakh front was no more than the backdrop to the next talks, which began on May 4 in Bishkek, for a peaceful settlement of the Karabakh problem. Participating in them, according to the RIA, are a Russian delegation headed by the chairman of the Council of the Inter-Parliamentary Assembly of the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] and Chairman of the Federation Council, Vladimir Shumeyko, and delegations from Kirghizia and the Aland Islands (Finland).

Vladimir Shumeyko pointed out the impermissibility of military actions between CIS countries and called on all politicians and military of the Commonwealth, upon whom the solution to the problem depends, to join the peace initiatives.

The Azerbaijan side considers the actions of Armenia on the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh to be military aggression and demands their immediate cessation. Speaking on May 4, the deputy chairman of the Supreme Soviet of Azerbaijan, Afiyandin Jalilov stated that as a result of combat actions more than 20% of the territory of Azerbaijan was occupied by Armenian armed formations, more than a million people had become refugees, more than 4 thousand persons were hostages, and around 700 populated areas lay in ruins. "In the long-standing conflict that has proliferated into war, both peoples are suffering, the Azeris and the Armenians," stressed Jalilov. He stated that he expects the signing of an immediate cease-fire agreement from the Bishkek meeting. The head of the Armenian delegation, Chairman of the Supreme Soviet Babken Ararktsyan stated that Armenia welcomes any peace initiatives directed toward cessation of the conflict, but is against fruitless declarations that do not take the real interests of the sides into account.

Representatives of Nagorno-Karabakh decided to air their opinions behind closed doors.

I believe it to be symptomatic that it was on May 4 that the President of Azerbaijan, Gaydar Aliyev, affixed his signature to the NATO "Partnership for Peace" program in Brussels.

Something else is symptomatic as well. By all appearances, a noisy trial is coming to a head in Baku. The former Defense Minister of Azerbaijan Rakhim Gaziyeu is accused of surrendering Sochi in May of 1992. According to the Procurator General of the Republic, Ali Omarov, Gaziyeu will be charged under three articles of the Criminal Code of Azerbaijan and may be imprisoned for 6 to 8 years. Remember that at one time ex-president Ayaz Mutaibov was accused of losing Khodzhal.

The fighting in Nagorno-Karabakh appears to have faded into the background, while both in Baku and in Yerevan they are much more interested in the political games surrounding it.

#### **Government Session Reviews Spring Call Up**

944K1247A Yerevan RESPUBLIKA ARMENIYA  
in Russian 17 May 94 p 1

[Unattributed report under the "Official Chronicle" column: "Augmenting the National Army—A Matter of Primary Importance"]

[Text] On 13 May in the Republic of Armenia there was a conference devoted to questions of organizing the spring recruitment. Participating in it were state ministers, ministers, Defense Ministry and Internal Affairs Ministry workers, managers from the procuracy, military commissars, chairmen of ispolkoms [executive committees] of the Yerevan city and rayon councils, and also through conference calls—representatives of ispolkoms of city and oblast councils of the republic.

Opening the conference, Prime Minister Grant Bagratyan emphasized the importance of the recruitment in the matter of reinforcement of the national army and defense of the country under the conditions of the continuing conflict in the region. The prime minister noted the need for both extensive explanatory work and the creation of a certain military-patriotic atmosphere by the mass media, on the one hand, and, on the other, a refusal to put up with draft dodgers and deserters and the application of punitive measures against them within the framework of existing legislation. In this connection Grant Bagratyan reported that by a government decree the republic procuracy was asked to file criminal cases in keeping with the established procedure against citizens who evade the draft and to take measures to return to Armenia draftees who are outside the republic. The corresponding instructions were also given to the ministries and departments.

Mr. Bagratyan also emphasized the need to ensure fairness and openness in the matter of conducting the draft and expressed the hope that, as a result of the hard work, the draft would go successfully.

State Minister Vazgen Sarkisyan talked about the problem of conducting the draft, introduced the members of the regional coordination commission, and addressed the

tasks facing each rayon. The state minister condemned the bad system that exists whereby through fair means or foul every soldier is transferred to the military unit of their native region. The draft will be conducted according to a nonregional principle, he said, and nobody will serve in his own rayon. The state minister denied rumors that 18-year-old draftees would be sent to the border regions of combat activities and called them absurd. Describing the draft as a task of not simply republic but of national significance, Vazgen Sarkisyan emphasized the importance of universal support for this work, noting that it would be desirable for deputies of the Supreme Council and parties and public organizations to participate in it. The state minister said that work was being done in this area and there had been appreciable results.

A number of other issues related to the draft were also discussed at the conference.

#### **Stricter Measures Against Draft Dodgers**

944K1247B Yerevan RESPUBLIKA ARMENIYA  
in Russian 17 May 94 p 1

[SNARK report: "Measures Made Stricter"]

[Text] Measures against individuals evading the draft into active military service are becoming stricter in Armenia. According to a government decree signed a couple of days ago, from now on citizens of draft age will be allowed to leave the republic only with the appropriate note on their military identification card.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has been instructed to submit proposals concerning the procedure for returning draft dodgers from other states.

At the same time certain economic sanctions and restrictions on draft dodgers and their families are being considered.

Additionally, the state minister for questions of defense, Vazgen Sarkisyan, speaking at a government conference, categorically denied the assertion that draftees would be sent immediately to the front lines, calling such rumors "absurd."

#### **Refugee Situation in Azerbaijan**

944D0021B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
4 May 94 p 3

[Article by Vladimir Larin: "There are 360 Russians in the Camps of Azerbaijan Refugees"]

[Text] At the invitation of the Russian community of Azerbaijan, deputies of the State Duma Sergey Baburin, Ivan Anichkin, Sergey Glotov and Anatoliy Greshnevnikov visited the Azerbaijan Republic from April 22 to 25.

The Russian parliament members met with the President of Azerbaijan Gaydar Aliyev and other high-ranking officials of the republic.

Members of the Russian parliament visited the camps of Azerbaijan refugees from the regions of Azerbaijan that had been occupied by Armenian armed formations.



As of today, Armenia has occupied around 20% of the territory of the Azerbaijan Republic (including 7 regions outside the borders of Nagorno-Karabakh proper: Agdam, Fizulin, Lachin, Kelbajar, Jebrail, Kubatlin, and Zange-lan). According to official data of the Azerbaijan side, more than 700 populated areas of Azerbaijan have been captured, and the majority of them burned and looted. The area of the territories occupied by the Armenian armed formations at present amounts to more than 17 thousand square kilometers. The advance of the Armenian expeditionary corps continues, including active attempts to "cut through" Tertery-Barda (Azerbaijan populated areas) and capture the Tbilisi-Baku route.

The problem of refugees and forced emigrants, whose numbers at present exceed 1 million (every seventh resident of Azerbaijan), including 200 thousand refugee Azeris from Armenia, is growing urgent. They are being accommodated in tent camps set up by the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Turkish Republic, and Arab charitable associations. As of today, 360 of the refugees are Russian. Iran has undertaken to maintain 100 thousand refugees and conducting a propaganda campaign about it.

The tent camps are in the steppe regions of Azerbaijan, where extremely high temperatures will set in within 1 to 1.5 months and may result in deaths, particular of children.

The deputies note that after the hasty withdrawal of Russian troops, and the virtual break in economic and cultural ties of the Russian Federation with the Azerbaijan Republic, trust in Russia on the part of the populace of Azerbaijan, including the Russians, is steadily falling. In the opinion of the parliament members, the region of vital Russian interests has gone without due attention from the leadership of the Russian Federation and the public, and this cannot continue.

They demand investigations into the statements of citizens of Azerbaijan that fighters are being recruited for the Armenian armed formations on the territory of the Stavropol and Krasnodar krais and the Rostov oblast of the Russian Federation.

Among the proposals of the members of the State Duma are: immediate provision of material, financial and other assistance (including the creation of a "cultural corridor") to the Russian community in Azerbaijan, intensification of peace-making efforts in the conflict zone, immediate withdrawal of Armenian troops from occupied territories, creation of a Consultative Council for Nagorno-Karabakh made up of representatives of sides with an interest in a peaceful settlement, and provision of effective assistance to refugees and forced emigrants from occupied regions of Azerbaijan, including the establishment and furnishing of a Russian tent camp, and delivery of medicines.

### Conscription Difficulties in Ganje

944K1258A Baku MOLODEZH AZERBAYDZHANA  
in Russian No 8, 19-26 May 94 p 1

[Interview with Lieutenant Shakir Tair-ogly Salimov, deputy military commissar of the Kyapyazskiy Rayon Military Commissariat, by correspondent I. Guseynov; place and date not given: "...Answer to Your Conscience..."]

[Text] Azerbaijan is experiencing difficult times. Today it is very important for all the people, each resident of the republic, whether he be at the front or in the rear, to clearly understand the extreme nature of the situation, to be maximally mobilized, and to find his place in the sacred cause of defense of the Motherland.

The front and the rear are linked by a common destiny, a common task. The military commissariat of Kyapyazskiy Rayon of Ganje arranges its activity on this basis. This is the subject of the discussion between our correspondent and the deputy military commissar of the Kyapyazskiy Rayon Military Commissariat, Lieutenant Colonel Shakir Tair-ogly Salimov.

[Guseynov] How long have you been working in the military commissariat?

[Salimov] I have been here since November of last year. I was assigned here after I sustained a serious injury in battle for liberation of our native land from the Armenian scumbags. After graduating from the Novosibirsk Higher Military-Political School with a desire to join the airborne troops, I served in Germany and the Transbaykal and Siberian military districts. At the beginning of 1991 when the Armenian aggression was increasing I decided that my place was at the front, where the fate of my Motherland and my people was being decided. When I took the military oath I swore to be faithful to my Motherland until the end of my days. This oath and, above all, the sense of civic duty to my Motherland and family, who raised me and got me on my feet, forced me to return to Azerbaijan. I have been severely wounded in battle three times. The last time I lost a leg and that, one might say, put me out of commission for good and made it impossible for me to fight. And so I ended up here. If I had my way I would go back to the front today, to my comrades in arms.

[Guseynov] The regular draft into the National Army has ended. How did it go in your rayon?

[Salimov] Extremely badly. To be truthful, the mobilization we are conducting cannot stand up under any criticism. As a military person I must emphasize that today, when Azerbaijan is being subjected to aggression from our neighboring republic, the question of universal mobilization acquires primary significance. The whole problem is that when executing the order on mobilization in the

majority of cases the edicts of the president of the republic and the Cabinet of Ministers are distorted. I am not saying this just to hear myself talk. After all, there are edicts to the effect that individuals who are the sole breadwinners for their parents are not subject to being drafted into the army, or a person whose brother is fighting at the front, or if one of his brothers has died at the front, and others are exempt from the draft. Why do we refuse to carry them out?

Understandably, a draft order, like all other military orders, is subject to strict obedience without discussion. But not at the expense of only sons. And how many of these chaps have already died and how many are fighting at the front today?!

[Guseynov] Comrade lieutenant colonel, it seems that only sons are a sore spot in your work.

[Salimov] Imagine that a worker of the law enforcement organs, say, in the precinct brings a young person of draft age to the military commissariat, knowing ahead of time that this is the only son of his parents, and he says nothing about it. By the time we sent him to the military unit his parents come with a paper from the housing operations section saying that he is their only son. But their son has already received his orders, he has entered the service, and now only an order from the Ministry of Defense can release him from further service.

[Guseynov] Shakir Mulladim, can it be that nobody other than only sons respond to the draft in the military commissariat of which you are in charge?

[Salimov] I think there are many draftees who are conscientious chaps who really understand their civic duty to the Motherland which is in danger. We have no problems with them. But there are also those who deliberately evade the draft and do not show up at the induction facility. And where should we look for them, and in general, is it the job of the military commissariat to look for people like this? And then "chaps" who are forced into the army exhibit cowardice at the front.

[Guseynov] Do you think that strengthening discipline is task number one in the army today?

[Salimov] Undoubtedly. At this time there is no task more important than that one. Without iron discipline the army is nothing but a wandering band of gypsies, but even there,

incidentally, people obey the law. It is hard to admit it, but our army does not have enough discipline today. Otherwise, there would be no cases of desertion and absence without leave from the military unit. Have you never seen young men in military uniforms roaming around the city and in public places? Well, many of them are absent without leave from their million subdivisions. And I think that these cowards who have fled from the battlefield deserve the most severe punishment.

[Guseynov] Are there cases of desertion in your rayon, and what measures are being taken against such people?

[Salimov] I do not deny that we have had cases of desertion and absence without leave from the combat unit by certain of our draftees. But we are not authorized to take any measures against them. This falls within the jurisdiction of the military procuracy, which must hold all deserters strictly accountable.

[Guseynov] In your opinion, is there a solution to the problem?

[Salimov] Of course, there is nothing on this earth that cannot be corrected. Today every citizen of the republic must clearly understand that there is a war going on in our land; the Armenian aggressors want to take away part of our territory and they are encroaching on our sovereignty and independence. Finally, all of us must understand that today at the front and in the rear there is one common task—to drive the Armenian occupiers out of our native land. And all of our interests must be subordinate to this task. In the localities we must step up propaganda and agitation work; in the schools and VUZ's [higher educational institutions] we must improve military-patriotic work with youth, the level of which, unfortunately, leaves something to be desired. In the streets, squares, and public places it is a rare event to see patriotic posters and appeals for defense of the Motherland. And in the army itself we must overcome the existing psychology of complacency and insubordination to officers and junior commanders. Sometimes even a little bit of gratitude shown to a fighting man before formation cheers him up, raises his fighting spirit, and calls him to victory. It is very important to understand this. Finally, and this is the main thing, the actual time has come when we must answer to our conscience as to precisely what we have done for the front, for victory.

## ARMS TRADE

### Summary of Results of FIDAE-94 Show

944D0030A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
30 Apr 94 p 6

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Correspondent Valentin Rudenko, Santiago-Moscow, under the rubric: "Russian Arms": "On the Sales Crossroads: A Chance Has Appeared for the Aircraft Builders in the Markets of Latin America—But Time Will Tell If They Will Be Able To Take Advantage of It"]

[Text] Our correspondent has already stated in his reports from Santiago that the Russian exposition was the largest and most representative at the FIDAE-94 International Aerospace Show that occurred at the end of March 1994 in the Republic of Chile. As for military aviation—the MiG-29, Su-27 and Su-30MK fighter aircraft—there simply weren't any competitors for them there. Everyone recognized that.

But today, a month after the conclusion of FIDAE-94, we would like to talk a bit not so much about the triumph of Russian aviation as much as about the results and the lessons of the airshows.

Russia had never previously participated in airshows in Latin America. And although they say that you can't expect perfection on the first try, that folk wisdom was not confirmed in this case. If you assess the results of our participation in FIDAE-94 on the whole then, as Russian Official Delegation Head Air Force Commander-in-Chief Colonel-General of Aviation Petr Deynekin noted, this was a real breakthrough in the skies of Latin America which must provide an impetus to the broad development of military-technical cooperation not only with Chile but also with other countries of this region. Previously, as is well known, we maintained contacts on the military line here only with Peru, Nicaragua and Cuba.

The majority of FIDAE-94's Russian participants acted under the aegis of the recently formed "Rosvooruzheniye" [Russian Arms] State Company. But there were also those firms that independently displayed their products and latest technologies. Among them was Moscow Aviation Production Association (MAPO).

Two years ago, this association obtained the right to independently, naturally under state monitoring, conduct negotiations and sign contracts on the subject of deliveries on the world market of one of the world's best light frontal aviation fighter aircraft—the MiG-29.

As at previous airshows, the MAPO delegation consisted of not only association specialists but also representatives of MiG ANPK [Aircraft Scientific Production Combine] imeni A.I. Mikoyan, and also of the primary enterprises—subcontractors, suppliers of radar gunsights, avionics, onboard weapons, and other systems. According to "Vimpel" GosMKB [State Machinebuilding Design Bureau] Chief Designer Gennadiy Sokolovskiy, Ryazan Instrument Plant Head Designer Yuriy Zelenyuk, the heads of other firms, and MAPO partners, this is a very proper approach.

When there are developers, manufacturers and component suppliers on one team, then you can conduct substantive negotiations not only on the delivery of the fighter aircraft themselves but also on their possible modernization, providing maintenance, supplying spare parts, and other issues already during the course of the airshow.

The Chilean airshow, although the largest in Latin America, still is regional in nature in contrast to Le Bourget or Farnborough. The displays consist of, first and foremost, what can actually be sold in the countries of this region. It's possible that some people will not agree with me, but we also underestimated this factor. For example, many experts think that the simultaneous participation of the MiG-29, Su-27 and Su-30MK in this airshow was hardly advisable.

Yes, our fighter aircraft were a sensation in the Chilean skies. Yes, their journalists christened FIDAE-94 a "show of stars". But we did not fly 17,000 kilometers to conduct aerial performances, but to offer our combat aircraft for sale. For those people who know very well the aircraft market situation, the financial capabilities of the Latin American countries, and the specific features of their military doctrine, it was already clear in Moscow that it is practically impossible to sell MiG's or Su's here. Therefore, we needed to determine which of the aircraft had a greater chance to penetrate the Latin American market and to assign a priority to it.

First of all, this would substantially reduce our expenditures for participation at the exhibition and, second, it would permit us to concentrate the attention of potential buyers on one object of sale.

For many foreign experts, the models of weapons and technologies displayed by Russia at FIDAE-94 became a real revelation. They did not find out about them from the advertising brochures or catalogs that were disseminated on the eve of the exhibition, but at the airshow.

Advertising costs money. And quite a bit of money. But we need to resort to these expenditures if we seriously intend to present ourselves on the international market. Moscow Aviation Production Association has learned this truth well. A small MAPO delegation, which settled all of the organizational issues, visited Chile several months prior to the airshow and met with the leadership of the ministry of defense, the Chilean Air Force, FIDAE, and conducted a series of press conferences. As a result, more than a dozen articles, which discussed the enterprise and MiG-29 fighter aircraft, were published in the local press already prior to the airshow's opening.

It would be unjust to not say kind words here directed at "Menkh" Publishing Group and specifically its Moscow Bureau, which assumed responsibility for the information support mission for the airshow's Russian participants. We received xerox copies of the most interesting articles from the central and Moscow newspapers on a daily basis. A series of articles on our weapons that were displayed at this exhibition were published on the pages of the magazines published by "Menkh".



Arms sales are a delicate matter with a mass of nuances, including in a political context. Even if there is a marvelous aircraft or helicopter, that still does not mean that they will mandatorily manage to sell it. Although the arms business is considered to be one of the most ancient businesses, we still have not properly mastered it.

And yet, do we have a chance to conquer the Latin American aircraft markets? Or were the hundreds of thousands of dollars spent by Russia for participation in FIDAE-94 cast to the wind?

At the present time, there are 123 combat aircraft in the Chilean Air Force inventory. These are primarily F-5, A-36, A-37, FGA-71 Hunter, and Mirage-50 fighter and fighter-bomber aircraft. Approximately half of them were accepted into the inventory in 1967 and 1975-76 and the remainder in 1982. Today, the question is being urgently raised on the replacement of obsolete aircraft with more modern aircraft. A special program has been developed on this score.

The Chilean Government intends to purchase approximately 18-20 "second hand" aircraft to replace the old Hunter fighter aircraft. The Republic of South Africa, Israel, England, France and Belgium are competing for this contract. Unfortunately, Russia is not on this list. However, a majority of experts admit that our fighter aircraft made a very favorable impression on the Latin Americans.

According to the statement of FIDAE President General Estey, who completed a more than one hour flight in a MiG-29 with Mikoyan Chief Pilot Roman Taskayev, this "aircraft permitted him to do things which he had never previously experienced". Chilean Air Force Commander-in-Chief General Vega, who flew with Sukhoi Test Pilot Igor Votintsev in a Su-30MK fighter-interceptor, also provided a flattering assessment. But, despite such favorable comments, our chances to win the already existing order are not great.

At the same time, we should not forget that in the future the Chileans plan to replace a second squadron of Pantera (former Mirage) combat aircraft. And here Russian fighter aircraft can already pose serious competition to the Swedish Gripen aircraft that are competing for that order.

"If preference is given to our fighter, we are prepared to equip the MiG-29's accepted into the West with navigation equipment so that expenditures for the replacement of the ground system are minimal, and to ensure in the entire range of aircraft operation guaranteed maintenance, at the level of world standards, and the supply of spare parts," said MAPO General Director Vladimir Kuzmin.

During the course of the airshow, the Moscow Aviation Production Association delegation visited ENAER national aviation enterprise that is the foundation of

Chile's aviation industry. This enterprise specializes in the production of the Chilean Air Force fleet and, in the event of the purchase of Russian fighter aircraft, we could develop a technical center based upon it for the maintenance of our aircraft which would be supplied not only to Chile but also to other Latin American countries. According to the assessment of MAPO Head Engineer Viktor Puzanov, there are all of the conditions for that here.

As for Western countries' combat aircraft, the reports from the airshow have already noted that it was very, very modestly displayed at FIDAE-94, primarily obsolete models of aircraft that are in the inventories of the Chilean and Peruvian air forces. For example, the United States in general decided not to demonstrate its combat aircraft here. Why? There are the most varied opinions on this score. Some assert that there simply isn't a need to do that because they already know American aircraft well here. According to others, this is linked with the strict position of the U.S. Congress that still maintains Chile on a "black list" of states to which the export of American military equipment is prohibited. We also had the opportunity to hear this version: The absence of American aircraft—this is a punishment for the Chileans for the invitation of Russian aircraft to FIDAE-94.

But, be that as it may, one thing is certain: The United States has had an impact on the world combat aircraft market and will have a very large impact in the foreseeable future.

But then again, there are no grounds to disparage our possibilities to conquer aircraft markets. Many experts think that the Latin American countries would like to do business with us and not with the Americans. The FIDAE-94 Airshow convincingly confirmed that. I had an opportunity to see the sparkle in the eyes of the generals of the air forces of Chile, Venezuela, Argentina, Brazil and Peru when they shared their impressions from the flights being conducted by our fighter aircraft. Without words, it was clear that they liked our aircraft.

Negotiations were being conducted from morning to night in the chalet of "Rosvooruzheniye" State Company, MAPO, and "Aviaeksport" V/O [Foreign Trade Association]. And although no serious contracts whatsoever were concluded directly at the exhibition, it is of course early to make hasty conclusions with regard to its commercial results. We sowed the seeds which must mandatorily produce sprouts. And we need to considerably tend it in order for a harvest to appear. It's possible that this will take years.

In short, with the conclusion of the exhibition, work on the promotion of our aircraft in the Latin American market has not been completed but has just begun. FIDAE-94 provided Russian aircraft builders a chance and it would be a sin not to take advantage of it.

## DEFENSE INDUSTRY

### Maley: Future Role of Defense Industry in Economy

944D0006A Moscow DELOVOY MIR in Russian  
11-17 Apr 94 p 15

[Interview with Security Council Interdepartmental Commission for Defense Industry Scientific-Technical Issues Chairman Mikhail Dmitriyevich Maley by DELOVOY MIR Correspondent Galina Sidorova and Candidate of Philosophical Sciences Irina Filatova of the Russian Academy of Sciences and Ministry of Labor Employment Problems Institute, under the rubric: "Opinion": "Mikhail Maley: We Need Firm, Comprehensible Rule"]

[Text] The interview of famous Russian Entrepreneur and "Rossiyskoye zoloto" [Russian Gold] AK Board Chairman Mark Masarskiy was published in the analytical attachment of DELOVOY MIR No 71. Continuing the theme "Russia From the Present to the Future", today we offer for the attention of our readers a conversation with a representative of the state structure—Security Council Interdepartmental Commission for Defense Industry Scientific-Technical Issues Chairman Mikhail Dmitriyevich Maley.

[DELOVOY MIR] The president and the government constantly talk about the market course of our economy. Indeed, in the process they in no way designate the nature of the impending order. First, they attempt to apply to Russia the caftan of the most successfully managed model, for example, the Swedish model, then they assert that Russia has its own, third, path of development. Mikhail Dmitriyevich, what do you think in this regard?

[Maley] I am a scientist and I know precisely: There are never any extremes in the material world. The Gauss curved distribution, which shows that extreme points are striving toward zero, is always operating. The primary sum of the processes and selections lies in the center.

The objective development of events has placed us on that middle path that lies between the extreme points—socialism and capitalism. You can call it a third path but this is not specifically a Russian third path. Since there isn't pure capitalism or pure socialism, society always moves along the center, there, where the amplitude of the curve is maximum. But you can call that path a third path only in the sense that each country has its own specific features of development. In Russia, they will be specifically Russian.

### An Experiment With a Deviation

[Maley] Right now experimental progress is occurring with fluctuations and deviations. I would call this the broken curve of progress. But its vector has still been designated: We are moving toward a society that will be a symbiosis of the ideal models of capitalism and socialism and, I would like to hope, the best of their parts.

[DELOVOY MIR] Maybe the middle toward which we are moving is also the happy medium, but there have been

painfully many fluctuations and deviations. Is there that staff on which we could reliably lean and still reach the goal?

[Maley] I think that any society, and ours in particular, cannot live in a space without an ideological orientation. There must be national goals and tasks that are naturally varied in significance. The main thing for Russia today is to return to the position of a great world power, not a military, but a great economic world power. In order to attain that, we must set a goal: To exceed the potential of the former USSR by at least a factor of two on a reduced territory.

A mass of subgoals result from this. Among others, this can be, for example, the following—for all great chess players to come from Russia, like before—from the USSR. A subgoal results from that—to produce so many chess boards and men that they can be purchased in the smallest village and that they will be cheap.

We could assign the task—to continuously participate in the construction of a transcontinental automobile highway that runs across all of Russia, Alaska and America. This is a realistic project.

That is, I want to say that we must task society with gigantic tasks. People must see the goal toward which they are moving at each actual moment.

[DELOVOY MIR] For some politicians, yes and simply citizens, the global goal is to re-establish the Soviet Union. In your view, is that realistic?

[Maley] I remember the Soviet Union and I don't like what happened to it. But that is an objective reality and we will hardly find the resources to return the USSR to its former state.

In general, a world process of disintegration is occurring. From my point of view, it has an objective foundation under it and we cannot restrain it with any sort of subjective wishes. Even such a rich state as Belgium was divided and Canada is being divided...

As for Russia's position and prestige, I am nearly convinced that I will be able to freely drive throughout all of the land with a Russian passport and I will be able to travel even better with the ruble than with the dollar. I personally believe that the ruble will become stronger than the dollar for an entire series of circumstances. Right now the Americans will overexert themselves with policing the world and God has relieved us of that obligation. We will be involved with ourselves.

[DELOVOY MIR] Certainly time itself. The redistribution of property has engendered such problems which Russian previously had not encountered.

[Maley] The primary portion of the people have been removed from the redistribution of property and monitoring it. Therefore, society has become highly stratified. This is unpleasant and dangerous for all of us. If there are more than a definite share of indigent people in the country, society will mandatorily be hurt.

**We Cannot Be Rich Among the Unfortunate**

[Maley] This American saying in a free translation—"Live and let live"—signifies the need to maintain a definite structure of society. The state not only does not monitor but it is also not even involved with the overall regulation of this process. Therefore, on the one hand, if the number of capitalists increases in Russia, on the other hand, there is an increased number of lumpen, and we cannot avoid social upheavals.

Society will be destabilized each time there is a definite number of people near the center of gravity. And "lumpenization" is occurring at an increased rate right now. This is associated with the government's social policy and with the objective state of the economy.

While beginning reform, Gaydar struck all of society. I am not condemning him for that. Everything was done in a Russian manner, in a revolutionary manner. He saved us about seven years of revolution but, unfortunately, he couldn't put the pieces back together.

[DELOVOY MIR] Although he was granted that opportunity.

[Maley] If we return to practice, he who destroys never builds. He simply organically cannot build, another psychology is needed. Therefore, the attempt to make Gaydar the creator from Gaydar the destroyer turned out to be a failure.

[DELOVOY MIR] What do you think, why is neither Gaydar's government nor the one that follows it managing to deal with inflation?

[Maley] In the mechanism for the regulation of prices, benefits, the correlation of income and expenditure and the budget sphere, inflation strengthens the government's position since it places enterprises and citizens in increasing dependence. A more or less comprehensible economic situation will come with financial stabilization and, in this situation, the subjects of the economy—enterprises, entrepreneurs and individuals—will begin to acquire increasing significance and the government's positions will begin to weaken. That is my point of view.

Where there are no comprehensible economic laws that operate objectively, political laws and the laws of coercion operate. And since political power is in the hands of the bureaucrats, isn't it a paradox that inflation is advantageous for the government so that it can be more significant and more powerful than in a normal situation.

[DELOVOY MIR] Maybe that is the reason why the government is not completely following the process of decentralizing the management of the economy?

[Maley] All conversations on the liberalization of the economy are only conversations for now. As before, all resources are drawn into Moscow and all authorizing normative acts emanate from here. The Moscow bureaucrats determine how much veterinary vaccine to produce, whom to authorize to haul edged or unedged board, how many trees to cut down and how many stumps to leave in the forest somewhere in Arkhangelsk Oblast.

Unfortunately, to a certain extent the current regime has repeated—and in an even worse variant at that—the last Soviet regime. The current government is building a market economy, say, with its right hand and is tightening the noose on Russia's throat with its left hand, and more cleanly than the Soviet regime. So, there are uprisings locally, nonpayment of debts and taxes and the appearance of "Urals republics".

Right now it would be appropriate to recall the golden age of the Khrushchev period when the well-known freedom of regional economic policy was permitted. Salvation is in this, this will help bring the country out of the crisis.

[DELOVOY MIR] And how do you regard the institution of presidential power in Russia?

[Maley] In general, I am inclined toward the presidential form of rule, toward the concentration of power at one point, and toward single centralized [yedinotsentrovyy] management of the economy. Because a parliamentary republic signifies two centers of real power and, consequently, a confrontation between them and the opportunity for violators of the law to maneuver between the two centers. But it is difficult to maneuver near one center.

As for the president, Yeltsin is implementing a moderately authoritarian regime of rule and, while he is in power, I think the regime will remain precisely that.

[DELOVOY MIR] How much has this regime been optimized for today's subjects of economic life?

[Maley] The subjects of economic life need firm, comprehensible rule. Therefore, if we theoretically discuss the best conditions for Russia's emergence from the economic crisis then, in my view, we would need enlightened authoritarian rule. Not high-handed, but the strict authoritarian rule of an intelligent person or group of people who would be alongside him.

World practice indicates that a concentration of power occurs under conditions of very powerful crises, beginning with a great economic crisis, the events in Chile and in Germany during Adenauer's time. Under conditions of liberalism and many voices, a regime emerges which we had from 1990 through 1993. Events are out of control and the simple man is suffering as a result.

**A Second Source of Hard Currency**

[DELOVOY MIR] Mikhail Dmitriyevich, you represent the military industrial complex and naturally the question arises: What role do the defense industry leaders assign to the military industrial complex in the future Russia?

[Maley] The military industrial complex will not have a future outside of the market. In the process, we recognize that the current defense industry's capacity is excessive for Russia. Approximately one fourth of this capacity is sufficient for Russia in order to totally supply the army's needs.



But if we resort to that enormous reduction, then 75% of those working at the complex's enterprises will find themselves in the grist of the transition period. We don't want to release that enormous number of people, all the more so that there is work for them.

The Russian defense industry occupies one of the leading places based upon the product produced, especially based upon those items that were quite recently top secret or were in stockpiles of semifinished products. That is, our workers and specialists are capable of producing a competitive product that is being bought and sold on world markets. And right now we would not like to transfer our jobs to the United States, France or Germany or to cede further sales markets for our arms.

Utilizing Russian Federation legislation, the Constitution and presidential edicts, we hope to preserve our position in world markets, to strengthen it and to progress further, while utilizing the terminology and arguments that the United States and the NATO countries previously used against us. That is, we will demand equal rights with all of the remaining arms-exporting countries.

Of course, this will not be simple. In order to work for export, we will have to heavily restructure. After the petroleum complex, the military industrial complex can become a second source of hard currency for the state. Its annual potential is \$8-12 billion cash and \$6-7 billion are adequate for the complex's total self-sufficiency and therefore it will be able to annually transfer \$2-4 million to the treasury.

At the same time, the military industrial complex continues to arm its army. We are giving it super new equipment and we are selling new equipment. The Russian Army will always outstrip other armies in the quality of arms and in the required quantity and at no charge—at the expense of foreign ministries of defense.

[DELOVOY MIR] You said that the military industrial complex will have to be heavily restructured. What do you have in mind?

[Maley] The development of market structures. We have been involved with that for the last two years and today we can talk about specific results. By way of illustration, the Military Industrial Complex Business Center is already operating. This is a quasi-governmental organization. Its mission is to weed out Western businessmen who come to us with \$15 dollars in their pockets in order to make money from us, but then again the Business Center must track our business people who either export capital or promise to resolve any problems on behalf of the president and who immediately sell 10 tonnes of uranium.

Further, we are creating the Military Industrial Bank. In capacity, this is the lead bank of the military industrial complex financial company and it will be second after the Central Bank in the capabilities of the financial system.

There is one other structure—the Russian Military Industrial Insurance Company. It will assume responsibility for insuring everything that concerns the complex.

The fourth structure is an information structure. There are 11 very powerful economic information institutes in our country. They have preserved all of the communications systems and essentially right now monitor the situation in the entire defense and nuclear industry. We want to unite all of these institutes into one information ring and, as an information system, to orient it not only toward servicing the military industrial complex but the entire Russian Federation economy.

I want to stress: We are creating neither a financial nor an economic autarky. We are simply uniting the complex's capacity and capabilities in an open form. These are open type structures.

#### The "Tiger" of the Next Decade

[DELOVOY MIR] But are there problems?

[Maley] Of course there are. The last has remained, in 1994, during which we cannot accept junior specialists into enterprises and institutes. In general, this is the last year when our society can permit itself to not accept young people into economic and technical VUZs [higher educational institutions]. But later the already irreversible break will begin—the break of scientific schools and concepts. For the military industrial complex, this signifies the loss of the intellectual level that previously existed. Therefore, we want to begin independent progress. We will agitate young people to go to technical institutes, to raise stipends; in short, to prepare the augmentation of educated people whom we need in the scientific-technical portion of the military industrial complex.

[DELOVOY MIR] Unfortunately, not all sectors will be able to begin independent progress and to train specialists for themselves, like the military industrial complex will. And in general, we cannot count on anyone, except the state, in the sphere of humanitarian education.

[Maley] If we want to take advantage of material and spiritual blessings, we need to outstrip others in the nation's general education level. A more educated nation and a more educated state always has advantages because they are capable of more rapidly organizing, anticipating the development of events, and technologically defining others. They will always be more wealthy. And material wealth always gives us the capability to develop the spiritual sphere. And here the process is on hand: The wealthy get rich in all regards, the poor get poor in all regards. Education—that is the key which unfortunately many people in the Russian government do not understand. And we will begin to degenerate if statewide measures directed at the support of education are not taken by the end of 1994.

[DELOVOY MIR] I wouldn't like to end the conversation on that sad note. Russia really has many problems. And maybe there are even more clearly seen from the side than from within. I would be interested in knowing, what does the West predict for us, while looking from the side?

[Maley] Isn't it paradoxical, but they assess Russia's opportunities more optimistically than we ourselves do. For example, the biggest American capitalists who belong to the so-called "Rapid" Group think. Of all of the

economic "tigers", Russia is the "tiger" of the next ten years. They predict an appreciable emergence from the economic crisis in four years.

What is curious is that this prediction coincides with the assessments that many of our experts provide but are self-conscious about publishing. In the background of the existing situation, our bright future is being perceived for now as something remote.

**Shulunov: 'New Approaches to Conversion'**

944D0006B Moscow *EKONOMIKA I ZHIZN*  
in Russian No 15, Apr 1994 p 1

[Article by Defense Enterprise Assistance League President A. Shulunov: "Conversion: New Approaches"]

[Text] According to the experts, 7-10 years and approximately \$150 billion and purposeful management of this process by the government were needed for the current conversion. Actually, 117 billion rubles (in 1992 prices) were allocated for conversion during the last two years. The matter is also being complicated by the absence of precise prospects in the sphere of production of defense products and any plans for the production of needed civilian products, the mechanism for financing conversion and the appropriate normative documents.

In fairness, I must note that the foundation of conversion was laid in 1989 already within the framework of the USSR. The increase of the volumes of production of complex appliances and consumer goods in 1993 is largely not only the consequence of the initiative of the labor collectives of converted enterprises but also of the stockpile of unfinished products created based upon the plans for 1989-1990. Furthermore, approximately 1,000 conversion programs, including 14 federal programs like "Vozrozhdeniye rossiyskogo flota" [Rebirth of the Russian Navy], "Razvitiye grazhdanskoy aviatsionnoy tekhniki" [Development of Civilian Aircraft] and "Razrabotka i proizvodstva novykh vidov meditsinskoy tekhniki" [Development and Production of New Types of Medical Equipment], were fundamentally produced, have undergone an examination by experts and have partially begun to be realized during the last two years. A number of regional conversion programs have been developed and are being implemented in Moscow, St. Petersburg, Udmurtiya, and in Sverdlovsk and Rostov Oblasts.

Three are quite a few positive examples of financing and the realization of some conversion programs by the state, domestic and foreign commercial structures and banks, but there are many more shortcomings. Perhaps the most substantial is the inadequate level and discontinuity of financing. In 1994, they planned to allocate approximately R4.4 trillion to complete work begun on 1992 programs and on programs that were approved by the RF Government in 1993. However, a total of R900 billion remained in the 1994 draft federal budget. Not a single federal targeted conversion program was financed normally.

Furthermore, the incorrect scheme for financing conversion projects under which both the customer and the

executor, as a rule, act as one person of the converted enterprise and financing of conversion projects is carried out through commercial banks without the required monitoring is a fundamental error. Parallelism in the development of a new conversion product that is not needed by anyone is a consequence of this scheme. For example, 12 plants simultaneously set up the production of oil-producing bellcranks. Up to 70-80 percent of conversion resources didn't reach converted enterprises or were placed at their disposal at the end of the year. Essentially, conversion credits went for the formation and consolidation of commercial banks.

In our opinion, conversion money must be allocated only to the customer of the civilian product (to those customers involved with transportation, gas, oil, and agriculture), who themselves select conversion program executors on a competitive basis. Under this variant of financing, the customer is capable of finding additional resources if he is interested in carrying out his project.

For example, today the RF Ministry of Fuel and Energy annually spends up to \$7 billion on the purchase of spare parts and new equipment for petroleum extraction and transportation of energy resources. The enormous production capacity of the missile builders, aircraft builders and engine builders that has been freed up is standing idle or is producing "frying pans". The slogan about hard currency replacement technologies has been proclaimed in state conversion programs but it practically doesn't work for the time being.

We have not been able to completely utilize the already created production capacity for the production of civilian products due to the serious financial situation of converted enterprises, the reduction of consumer solvency, and the systematic delay and reduction of the amount of state resources being allocated to the defense complex. But under these extreme conditions, the defense industry is increasing the output of civilian products by 1.5-2% per year. And the main issue remains—financing conversion and effective utilization of limited resources.

In our opinion, the state is obligated to assume responsibility for retooling defense enterprises to develop import replacement production; to introduce effective energy and resource-conserving equipment and technologies; to transfer dual-use technologies to the civilian sector of the economy that were previously developed in the military industrial complex; to develop export opportunities for converted enterprises; and, to render support to those defense enterprises whose conversion programs are not part of federal programs but are effective and directed at saturating the market with goods.

But regional conversion programs must pursue the goal of offering the opportunity to combine freed-up incomplete scientific production capacity to the region's enterprises of various sectors of industry and to integrate them in sufficiently long technological chains for the production of an end product. Therefore, regional management (through financing of conversion) of the process of the formation of

new cooperative production ties between converted enterprises and also civilian sector enterprises can turn out to be an important factor for increasing the operating effectiveness of Russian industry.

Conversion cannot be successful without the state's substantial support. But the experience of recent years attests that super-preferential credits indiscriminately allocated to everyone provokes enterprises to knowingly submit unrealistic conversion projects.

We think that the enterprise conversion projects must have serious technical-economic substantiation, undergo an examination by experts and be financed on a competitive basis. Commercial banks can be involved in the dissemination of conversion credits only under the following conditions: Prevention of the diversion of allocated resources for commercial credits to third parties; precise determination of the time periods for the completion of documents associated with obtaining credits; strict sanctions with regard to commercial banks for the violation of credit granting terms; and, Russian Central Bank monitoring of the activities of commercial banks that are financing conversion projects.

We need to intensively utilize the finances of various stock companies and banks and attract foreign capital for the successful resolution of conversion problems under stingy state financing. Foreign investments of not only the MVF [International Monetary Fund] and EBRR [European Reconstruction and Development Bank], but also of companies that are interested in our products and scientific-technical achievements could render enormous assistance in the implementation of conversion. However, the absence of guarantees and the instability of the legislative and tax base is restraining foreign investors.

Many managers of regions and major enterprises have understood that without the creation of outside-budget conversion assistance funds [several words unreadable] which is the most rational form for the accumulation of resources designated to finance conversion at the regional level is the creation of the appropriate—oblast, kray, republic—conversion assistance fund. Its income portion must be formed through deductions from the local budget, payments of interested commercial structures of any form of property, and payments of founders. We can also recommend to the local authorities such steps as the allocation of raw materials to provide guarantees to foreign investors, the transfer of the primary funds of enterprises to leasing, and the direction of resources from the privatization of defense enterprises for their conversion. State support of these funds could be carried out by granting them various types of tax and other financial benefits. And, in my opinion, we need to develop and approve a typical charter of a regional conversion assistance fund on the governmental level in order to move this work off of dead center.

It is also advisable to grant conversion credits to enterprises under the deposit of property with the completion of the appropriate documents stipulated by tax legislation or

through the obligations of insurance companies. The Russian Ministry of the Economy has developed and approved the appropriate statute.

## FOREIGN MILITARY AFFAIRS

### Grachev Discusses Asian Security With Korean Defense Minister

944D0028A Moscow *KRASNAYA ZVEZDA* in Russian  
30 Apr 94 p 1

[Article by Aleksandr Golts: "Military Contacts Will Widen"]

[Text] On 29 April General of the Army Pavel Grachev, the Russian Federation defense minister, met with South Korean Defense Minister Lee Ben Teh, who was in our country on an official visit. This was the first by the head of South Korea's military department in Russia. Besides the problems of further development of bilateral ties in the military area, discussion of the problems of security of the Asia-Pacific region, and chiefly that of nuclear weapons proliferation on the Korean peninsula, occupied an important place in the talks. The Russian defense minister expressed concern over the possibility of North Korea's abrogation of the Nuclear Weapons Nonproliferation Treaty. On his part, the Korean defense minister emphasized that the world community's task is to prevent worsening of the situation on the Korean Peninsula.

Pavel Grachev turned his counterpart's attention to the idea of creating a system of collective security in Asia. And this idea was accepted with interest. As a result of the negotiations the defense ministers of the two countries signed the Declaration on Military Cooperation and the Memorandum of Understanding Between the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense and the South Korean Ministry of National Defense on Military Contacts.

## SECURITY SERVICES

### Conscripts for Cossack Border Units Called Up

94UM0398A Moscow *SEGODNYA* in Russian  
No 74, 21 Apr 94 p 3

[Article by Vadim Nesvizhskiy under the "Boundaries" rubric: "Can an 'Alien' Become a Cossack?: Russia Creating Military-Type Settlements on Land Bordering Finland and Estonia"]

[Text] "The call-up for the Cossack troops which we have been awaiting for some time has begun." These were the words spoken by Ataman Boris Almazov of the North-western Cossack District as he commented on the decision made by the leadership of Russia's Border Troops relative to granting Cossacks three border control points on land bordering Finland and Estonia, for which they must recruit the manpower. Under quotas set by the North-western Border District, the Cossack association Nevskaya Stanitsa and the Northwestern Cossack District are to supply 30 conscripts to each of three border control points, with one each near Vyborg, in Karelia, and in Pskov



Oblast. The general idea is that Cossacks are to be recruited in three call-ups to render the three control points all-Cossack in nature.

Mr. Almazov also said that it is assumed that, after completing their term as conscripts, most of the Cossacks will stay on at the control points by taking up contract service. "A criterion we applied in selecting the control points was availability of land which can in the future be transferred to the Cossacks so they can conduct their own economy. In the case of the Pskov Oblast border control point, for example, land is available, and everything is ready for Cossacks to settle at the new border," said Boris Almazov to SEGODNYA's correspondent. It is thought that, starting with the next call-up, Cossacks assigned to serve at the border will undergo—in addition to basic training—special training to be administered in Cossack associations located in Saint Petersburg.

The Nevskaya Stanitsa and Cossack circle are already preparing for a ceremonial send-off to the border, with this to include a mandatory prayer service and parting speeches by atamans. However, with the problem of the border troop leadership resolved, the atamans ran into an unexpected obstacle: It came to light that there were only 80 men requesting assignment to Mr. Almazov's 90 billets, with 30 of them conscripts and 50 contract servicemen. The Cossack ataman remarked that although the present call-up is being carried out in haste, it would otherwise still be difficult to recruit even this small number of men wishing to serve at the border.

In addition, representative of the RF Northwestern Border Troop District commander Sergey Dugalev, who has doubts about the possibility of realizing the idea of purely Cossack border control points, said that the military commissariat has so far received only 13 requests for the Cossack billets. On top of that, Mr. Dugalev is not sure that young Cossacks will wish to settle in a new area and remain on duty on a contract basis even after they complete 18 months of service: "There is always the possibility that the Cossacks will not remain in border duty service after being granted land."

Nonetheless, Cossack atamans are full of optimism, stating that they are in favor of assigning to the new generation an elderly man who would live in the same barracks as the inductees and pass on to the young men "the Cossack traditions and spiritual values." The Cossacks, attempting to resolve the manpower shortage problem, decided to "expand the ranks." Nevskaya Stanitsa Campaign Ataman and Russian Army Lieutenant Colonel Dmitriy Simyakin explained: "We decided to make an exception, starting this year, by enlisting for Cossack service youths of non-Cossack origin instead of Cossacks by blood."

Northwestern Cossack District Ataman Boris Almazov, commenting on the above decision, remarked that "Cossacks at the present time constitute the sole Russian national movement that has a national, non-extremist orientation," and that not all ethnic origins may have representatives as new members of the Cossack society. "We will not accept ancient enemies of Orthodoxy," stated

the Cossack leader of the Russian Northwest, who is forming detachments for duty at the border control points.

Boris Almazov, characterizing the recent incident occurring on the Russian-Estonian border in which violators killed one man and wounded two others as a "real border conflict," stated that the border should be closed, and the ones best able to handle that are the Cossacks. This, especially considering the fact that there are cadres who have completed their "trial period," in that in the Fedorovka Stanitsa, which is included in the Nevskaya Stanitsa, most members have done some fighting on the side of the Bosnian Serbs.

Incidentally, the above holds true only in case the "best cadres" are not employed elsewhere: According to the statement made by Nevskaya Stanitsa Campaign Ataman Mr. Simyakin, if NATO does not discontinue bombing Serbian positions, and if Russia, "does not as in 1914 set out to help her brotherly Serbs," Russia's Northwestern Cossacks will once again undertake sending volunteers to the Bosnian fronts. Then our border apparently will have to wait.

#### Alpha Antiterrorist Unit Reviewed

944D0036A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
23 Apr 94 p 3

[Interview with Major General Gennadiy Zaytsev, Alpha antiterrorist unit chief, by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Vladimir Berezko; place and date not given; under the rubric "Combating Terrorism": "Major General Gennadiy Zaytsev: Alpha Is Manned Only by Intellectuals"]

[Text] From the KRASNAYA ZVEZDA file:

Gennadiy Nikolayevich Zaytsev, born 1934. Graduated from the USSR KGB Higher School. From 1977 to 1988, and 1992 to the present—chief of the special group "A" [Alpha]. For courage and bravery in neutralizing especially dangerous criminals, awarded the title Hero of the Soviet Union. Major general.

Married. Son is a captain in the Federal Counterintelligence Service.

[Berezko] Gennadiy Nikolayevich, this is a special year for Alpha—it will celebrate its first "adult" jubilee. How did it all start back then, 20 years ago?

[Zaytsev] In the early 1970's terrorism in its most dangerous forms—hostage-taking, aircraft hijacking—began to occur in our country, too. For instance, in 1973 at Vnukovo Airport four armed criminals seized a Yak-40 aircraft with passengers on board. KGB and MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] personnel in a combined effort freed the hostages and neutralized the criminals. Despite a successful final outcome, the operation was tense because nobody had any special training in localizing such situations.

Taking this and other circumstances into account, a decision was made to set up within the KGB system a special

antiterrorist unit. By the way, a little later an analogous unit was also set up in the GDR, also called "A."

...At the time the unit had no more than 30 members. Within two months the unit was completely manned and training began. The first chief of the special unit was Hero of the Soviet Union Major Vitaliy Bubenin, who was the commander of this group until April 1977.

[Berezko] How many years did it take before the first operation? And how many of them has the unit conducted altogether?

[Zaytsev] It is my deep conviction, based on practical experience, that at least five years of intensive training is needed for the unit to exist not merely on paper but to get its personnel to the point of being able to act professionally and competently in any situation. Over this period people must become not just professionals in antiterrorism but also "adjust" psychologically.

The group conducted its first combat operation on 28 March 1979 at the U.S. Embassy. What happened is that the embassy's second secretary Pringle met and brought into the embassy's consular section a stranger, who then threatened to activate an explosive device if the Americans did not take him in a diplomatic car to Sheremetyevo airport and arrange for him to fly abroad. And although overall the operation was successful—the terrorist, Yuriy Vlasenko, was neutralized and there were no casualties—I must say that even then not everything went smoothly...

Altogether, the group has conducted several dozen operations.

[Berezko] Which one is the most memorable for you?

[Zaytsev] The one I remember most was the operation in Mineralnyye Vody in 1988, since the lives and well-being of children were at stake. As you may recall, Yakshiyants' gang took 31 schoolchildren and a teacher hostage. This was already the second such instance in our practice. The first time, children were taken hostage in December 1981 in the city of Sarapula in the Udmurt ASSR [Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic]. In that case, however, the hostages were tenth-graders, while in Mineralnyye Vody the children were 10-12 years old.

All through the night and the first half of the day I had to conduct intensive negotiations with the bandits over the radio, trying to reduce their aggressiveness and in the end get them to release the hostages. After the negotiations, only the Il-76 crew remained in the hands of the bandits...

I want to take this opportunity to mention the exceptional bravery and courage of military helicopter pilots Colonel Valentin Padalkin and Major Vladimir Stepanov, and the Air Force commander in chief, Lieutenant General (Aviation) Vladimir Mikhaylov, who just recently helped to free children taken hostage in Rostov.

[Berezko] Gennadiy Nikolayevich, as I gather, a certain "diplomacy" in bulletproof vests is practically inevitable in combat operation, is it not so?

[Zaytsev] The main purpose of such "diplomacy" is to reduce terrorists' aggressiveness, to avert violence against hostages. There are special tactics for conducting such negotiations, and the operative who "converses" with the criminals must possess extensive operational and life experience, "feel" the criminal, and be a psychologist to a certain extent, in order to "massage" the situation into the overall design.

[Berezko] But the special unit does not always limit itself to persuasion...

[Zaytsev] We have a very broad and quite effective range of means that allow us to take control of the situation. For instance, special grenades. There are also special weapons that have been designed to our specifications and are used only by the special unit. Frankly, however, I would prefer not to be too open in these matters. The point is that when we talk about this, we unwittingly arm potential terrorists with information that can be used against us. By the way, at the time Yakshiyants said straight out that before taking the hostages they had studied attentively all the literature on special unit operations in our country and abroad and even reviewed all available documentary footage.

[Berezko] Is there division by combat specialization within the group?

[Zaytsev] Each member of the special unit must be completely proficient in using standard-issue weapons: the Makarov handgun and submachine gun... There also is specialization: snipers, combat swimmers, explosives experts who can remove any obstacle with a jeweler's precision, radio specialists, and many others.

For instance, combat swimmers were utilized in 1978 in Cuba during the World Youth and Students festival. The Cubans officially requested help in protecting the ships Gruzuya and Leonid Sobinov, where the Soviet delegation lived. Our personnel went on "underwater duty" together with members of the Navy's special team. Combat swimmers also are used in the protection of highest officials.

[Berezko] How do you "forge" the operatives' skills?

[Zaytsev] Through training, which is conducted daily. All the methodology we use is our own, but we also take into account the useful experience of others.

"Our" hand-to-hand combat includes the most effective elements of all known one-on-one combat and pursues one single goal—to enable the operative to fight an armed criminal in a situation of limited space. The methodology of marksmanship training also has been made to "fit" the unit's tasks. Our operatives go through mandatory training in tanks and paratroop training. In the final analysis, the entire program of professional training is aimed at developing in the operative the preparedness to take mortal risks for the sake of saving other people's lives.

Once every quarter the group undergoes testing by a specially developed system, which provides an objective picture of the operative's abilities.

[Berezko] Have there been instances of people failing the tests?

[Zaytsev] If a group member demonstrates a substantially lower performance level, especially in tactical and special disciplines, and does not draw the appropriate conclusion, dismissal is inevitable. But I want to emphasize that this is an extremely rare case. The main principle of combat training in the unit is "self-education," in which the operative on his own keeps himself in the shape needed to carry out the tasks.

[Berezko] Gennadiy Nikolayevich, it is impossible to foresee where and when the next hostage situation may occur. Is this circumstance taken into account in training?

[Zaytsev] We try to "play out" during training all possible hostage scenarios: in an aircraft, building, bus, open space, and so on. As to unexpectedness, we are in constant readiness for it. Each of our operatives has a personal call receiver—multitone—through which he can be reached. The time frame between receiving the call and the point where the operatives are fully equipped and on the way to the airport is no more than 1.5-two hours. One unit in the group is constantly on combat-ready duty, which in almost 20 years has never been suspended even for a minute.

[Berezko] The selection criteria for Alpha must be very tough.

[Zaytsev] Yes, the selection process is indeed strict. Only a military serviceman fit to serve in the Airborne Troops, between 25 and 28 years old—an adult mind with the strength of youth—may be accepted into the antiterrorist unit. Our main "suppliers" are the Ryazan Higher Paratroop Command School, the Moscow Higher General Troops Command School, and two Border Troops military institutes.

First a candidate is checked with respect to physical fitness. Handgun marksmanship is a mandatory test. In some aspects, the requirements for the candidate exceed the norms of category III in sports, and in marksmanship—category II. At the same time, I want to say that it is

much more preferable for the unit to have a candidate with a range of category II achievements in different sports than a distinguished master of sports in, for instance, classic wrestling.

And the most important part. More than 70 percent of our people have a higher education. A special unit operative should be not a mere fighting machine, but an intellectual capable of independent thinking, forecasting, and making decisions on the basis of analysis. The candidate's intellectual abilities are tested through in-depth study of his personality, tests, meetings, and conversations with the mandatory participation of a psychologist. If a candidate has a quarrelsome personality, there is no place for him in the unit. Each operative must be 100-percent confident in his colleagues. More than his own life will depend on it.

[Berezko] You said that the maximum age for serving in the special unit is 40. By civilian standards, these are young people...

[Zaytsev] Our former members get offers to work for various state and commercial structures. In addition, the Association of Antiterrorist Unit Veterans has been set up and is functioning; it is headed by Sergey Goncharov, who is now a member of the Moscow City Duma. The association's main task is to help the operative find his place in society after discharge.

[Berezko] Gennadiy Nikolayevich, unlike our economy, terrorism is currently on the rise. How do you see the prospects of combating this "plague of the twentieth century"?

[Zaytsev] These days we can only fight runaway terrorism if the state sets up a well-designed system for combating this evil, with the command of antiterrorist activities being concentrated in a single National Center. Also, we have to remember that terrorism does not recognize borders and we need to set up coordination and interaction with foreign special services, including those in the near abroad.



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**28 June 1994**

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